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INTRODUCTION
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the highest political leader in Japan,
shook his head in disbelief. 1 His tenure as Prime Minister had been tense, partly
due to the ongoing question of a replacement airfield for the U.S. Marines in
Futenma. 2 A predecessor, Yukio Hatoyama, also suffered political fallout
stemming from his reversal of a public promise to find a replacement location
for the U.S. Marine Corps Air Station. 3 Prior to the Hatoyama administration,
the Japanese government had selected a new location for the Marine Air Station,
a remote area far removed from the busy city of Okinawa in Henoko. Moving to
Henoko was intended to be a “win-win” for both Japan and the United States as
it would alleviate the environmental concerns and urban encroachment that
plagued the Futenma Air Station’s operations while complying with United
States’ military operational requirements. 4 Yet Japan will not be moving the
Marines from Futenma to Henoko anytime soon. The National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA), enacted in 1966 with the goal of preserving the
“cultural foundations of the [n]ation . . . in order to give a sense of orientation to
the American people,” 5 effectively stopped Japan’s proposed movement of the
Marines to Henoko.

1. Uncertainty about the future of the Marine base continues to this day. See Travis Tritten,
Lack of Solid Plan Holds Up Marines’ Move from Okinawa, McCain Says, STARS AND STRIPES,
Aug. 22, 2013. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has been the Prime Minister of Japan since December
2012 and also served as Prime Minister from September 2006 to September 2007. See PRIME
MINISTER OF JAPAN AND HIS CABINET,
http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/96_abe/meibo/daijin/index_e.html. Junichiro Koizumi was Prime
Minister from 2001–2006 when the Dugong litigation first began. Id. Prime Minister Abe recently
backed the move of the Marines off Okinawa to a less crowded area; see Martin Fackler, Japan
Leader Backs Move of U.S. Base on Okinawa, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2013, at A4.
2. See, e.g., Tritten, supra note 1.
3. There were eight Prime Ministers of Japan since the beginning of the Dugong litigation.
The question of “where to place the American Marines at Futenma?” has affected each Prime
Minister in some capacity over the past ten years.
4. Dugong v. Gates (“Dugong II”), 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (stating
that the court “acknowledges that Japan has ultimate responsibility for selecting the location of the
replacement facility, and that Japan’s site selection was driven by its own concerns for
environmental, engineering, political and cost factors”) (emphasis added). Japan’s decision to move
was made after intense negotiations with U.S. officials who sought assurances that the new location
met its military operational requirements. A variety of United States-Japan groups have assisted in
making recommendations on the location of military bases in Japan over the past twenty years. They
include the bilateral Security Consultative Committee (SCC), the Special Action Committee on
Okinawa (SACO), and the bilateral Futenma Implementations Group (FIG), a committee under the
supervision of the SCC. See Dugong v. Rumsfeld (“Dugong I”), No. C 03-4350 MHP, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3123, at *2–3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2005). This case, decided in 2005, later changed the
named Defendant from Donald Rumsfeld to Robert Gates to reflect the change in the Secretary of
Defense. To avoid confusion, this Article will use the shorthand “Dugong I” to refer to the 2005
federal court decision, “Dugong II” to refer to the final 2008 decision, and “Dugong rulings” or
“Dugong” litigation to refer to both decisions.
5. 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(2) (2010).
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Many Japanese citizens and American environmentalists were incensed as
the new Henoko location included the habitat for the dugong, a species of
marine mammal listed as a protected “natural monument” on the Japanese
Register of Cultural Properties. 6 Lacking a judicial remedy in Japan, they turned
to U.S. law with success—the NHPA. 7 when used in conjunction with the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA). authorizes a lawsuit against federal
agencies to include the Department of Defense (DoD) in a U.S. federal court. 8
Following several years of litigation, the court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs,
requiring the DoD to account for the effect of the move on the dugong and
effectively thwarting Japan’s decision to move the Marines to the new location
at Henoko. 9
In Dugong v. Rumsfeld (Dugong I) in 2005 and Dugong v. Gates (Dugong
II) in 2008, a U.S. district court interpreted the NHPA to protect a wild animal
outside the United States in another sovereign territory, calling into question
Japan’s decision to move a U.S. military installation from one part of Japan to
another. 10 In the Dugong rulings, the court applied the litigants’ innovative use
of the NHPA’s extraterritorial provision 11 to protect foreign cultural and
historical properties as defined by the foreign sovereign’s law. This application
went beyond the traditional scope of the NHPA. 12 While the precedent is
limited to a single federal district, it downplays broader prudential foreign policy
concerns that have traditionally constrained the judiciary in such areas, most
recently reaffirmed in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. by the U.S.
Supreme Court. 13 The NHPA now no longer functions solely as a domestic
preservation statute of limited scope and jurisdiction. In light of the Dugong
6. Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1084. The Japanese citizens who were party to the U.S.
lawsuit were unable to bring a lawsuit to protect the dugong in Japanese court as the Japanese legal
system lacked a citizen suit provision and a clear judicial enforcement mechanism. See also
Mitsuhiko A. Takahashi, Okinawa Dugong v. Rumsfeld: Extraterritorial Operation of the U.S.
Military and Wildlife Protection Under the National Historic Preservation Act, 28 ENVIRONS
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 181, 190 (2004); Bob Egelko, Imperiled Mammal Threatened by Plan for
Okinawa Base, Court in S.F. Hears Activists Advocate Applying U.S. Law, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 5,
2004, at B4.
7. Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.
8. Id.
9. The Okinawa dugong was listed as one of the ten plaintiffs in the lawsuit. The other
plaintiffs included three individual Japanese citizens and six American and Japanese environmental
associations. While the court did not find standing for the Okinawa dugong, as it failed to meet the
“person” definition under the Administrative Procedures Act, the case was decided with the
Okinawa dugong as the named plaintiff. Id. at 1083. An animal was first recognized with standing to
sue in Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981). But see
Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining to expand the
definition of person to include animals such as whales, porpoises, and dolphins).
10. Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1082; Dugong I, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3123, at *18.
11. The National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-665, 80 Stat. 915
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 470–470x-6 (2012)).
12. The World Heritage Convention’s obligations were incorporated into the NHPA in 1980
at 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2.
13. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
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rulings, the NHPA impacts broader foreign relations and national security and
must be addressed. Two novel issues are discussed in this Article.
First, this Article asserts the Dugong rulings were wrongly decided. The
rulings ignore the NHPA’s scope, the larger context of American historic
preservation law, and weighty foreign policy concerns most recently reaffirmed
in Kiobel. The judicial branch should exercise caution in deciphering the
NHPA’s application overseas as these federal actions impact sensitive foreign
relations.
Relatedly, the NHPA may take on increased importance in environmental
litigation overseas as the Dugong rulings apply the extraterritorial provision of
the NHPA in contrast to judicial enforcement of other U.S. statutes protecting
the environment. 14 Courts have been reluctant to construe U.S. laws to provide
environmental protections overseas. 15 And the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kiobel held that there is a presumption against extraterritorial application of the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS) on claims stemming from wrongful corporate
environmental practices. 16
Second, this Article argues that the choice for inclusion of the World
Heritage Convention’s (WHC) treaty obligations within the NHPA in 1980 and
the Dugong rulings together result in a potential magnification of the NHPA’s
impact on overseas federal activities as the NHPA’s jurisdiction and scope are
seemingly expanded. 17 This legal expansion defies practical layperson
expectations of the NHPA’s scope and raises the specter of further uncertain
domestic legal rulings that broadly construe the NHPA and potentially affect
foreign relations. For example, if an animal can be protected overseas via the
NHPA, can such an interpretation of the NHPA be used to protect living animals
domestically? If the NHPA is not solely a domestic preservation statute, then it
is truly an exceptional U.S. environmental statute 18 that applies within another
sovereign’s jurisdiction. 19
14. See Jonathan Remy Nash, The Curious Legal Landscape of the Extraterritoriality of U.S.
Environmental Laws, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 997, 1004–10 (2010) (describing the numerous U.S.
domestic environmental laws that lack an extraterritorial provision).
15. See, e.g., Arc Ecology v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) had no extraterritorial effect).
16. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1659. Kiobel has similarities with both Dugong decisions: both
addressed U.S. federal court jurisdiction in matters in another sovereign. Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d
1082 (N.D. Cal. 2008); Dugong I, No. C 03-4350 MHP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3123 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 2, 2005).
17. Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1082.
18. This Article uses the term “environmental statutes” broadly to encompass the array of
U.S. laws that provide for protection of the environment and its natural resources. These include, for
example, the major environmental statutes (e.g. the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387, and
the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7626) and natural resource statutes (e.g. the Sikes Act, 16
U.S.C. § 670, and the Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–433).
19. But see Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347, applied to a federal action in
Antarctica). The court, however, did distinguish Antarctica—a landmass without a sovereign—from
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Due to the uncertain outcomes of U.S. law and larger foreign relations
concerns discussed in Kiobel, this Article contends that Congress should clarify
the proper scope and jurisdiction of the NHPA. 20 Congress should re-anchor the
NHPA in its proper place as the statutory successor of the American historic
preservation movement and it should be clarified to minimize any unforeseeable
impacts on foreign relations overseas. How could this statute, associated with
the protection of domestic physical historic properties, with origins in the larger
U.S. historic preservation movement, be utilized to protect a wild animal in
Japan? And what are the practical consequences of such a determination for the
scope of the NHPA on future environmental enforcement matters both at home
and overseas? These questions will be explored below.
Part I provides an overview of both the NHPA’s history and the 1972
WHC, 21 an international convention that protects properties of cultural and
natural heritage. Part II discusses the NHPA’s extraterritorial application by
including an analysis of Dugong I and Dugong II. Part III addresses the
extraterritorial application of the NHPA, contrasting the NHPA with the more
limited reach of other environmental statutes as construed by the courts. Part IV
addresses the broader foreign relations concerns of the NHPA’s extraterritorial
application. Part V offers concrete recommendations for Congress to clarify the
scope and jurisdiction of the NHPA.
I.
OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT AND THE WORLD
HERITAGE CONVENTION
The NHPA 22 is primarily intended to preserve the historic physical
properties within the United States. 23 Since its inception, it has played a critical
role in preserving numerous historical properties in the United States. Today,
over 88,000 properties are on the U.S. National Historic Register, whose origins
date from 1935. 24 This section provides an overview of American preservation
law leading to the passage of the NHPA and its 1980 WHC implementing
amendments.

other sovereign nations. Id. at 529. After Dugong I and II, the NHPA, as applied overseas, appears to
be more powerful than when applied domestically, protecting properties that are beyond what is
customarily protected in the United States.
20. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1659.
21. Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage art. 2–
3, Nov. 16, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37 [hereinafter WHC].
22. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470–470x-6 (2012).
23. See generally Carol Rose, Preservation and Community: New Directions in the Law of
Historic Preservation, 33 STAN. L. REV. 473, 474–76 (1981) (providing a comprehensive
background on the preservation movement in the United States).
24. See generally Nat’l Reg. of Hist. Places, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,
http://www.nps.gov/nr/research/index.htm. (last visited Mar. 6, 2014) (providing an up-to-date list of
the number of historic places on the National Register).
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A. American Historic Preservation Law: A Deliberate, Evolutionary
Progression
The NHPA was signed into law in 1966; 25 it is “the key federal law that
establishes a federal policy for the preservation of cultural and historic resources
in the United States.” 26 The NHPA is the statutory and evolutionary extension
of earlier citizen-derived private and public historic preservation efforts.
According to one scholar, Professor Carol Rose, there have been three phases of
historic preservation: (1) preservation for “inspiration” where places, such as
Civil War battlefields, convey a sense of community; (2) preservation for
“architectural merit” which included the preservation of larger historic districts;
and (3) preservation for community. The enactment of the NHPA falls within
the third phase of America’s historic preservation movement. 27
The U.S. historic preservation movement’s origins are fondly associated
with the efforts of a determined group of women to save George Washington’s
home in Mount Vernon, Virginia in the face of governmental apathy. 28 In the
mid-nineteenth century, the group raised an extraordinary $200,000 in a
grassroots fundraising campaign. 29 Today, the Mount Vernon Ladies’
Association is the oldest national historic preservation organization in the United
States and continues to own and operate Mount Vernon. 30
Interest in historic preservation increased following the Civil War when the
United States Congress and local organizations acted to protect the sites of
historic battlefields. For example, in the late nineteenth century, the federal
government sought to condemn a property for the creation of a national
battlefield monument at Gettysburg. 31 Then, judicial protection of preservation
25. See, e.g., JULIA H. MILLER, A LAYPERSON’S GUIDE TO HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAW
(2004). This guide provides a good overview of the NHPA’s purpose and background.
26. Id. at 3. While the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4375
(2012), and Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 303 (2011), also
protect historic resources, they will not be the subjects of this Article, largely because they lack an
express extraterritorial basis.
27. Cf. Rose, supra note 23, at 481–82, 484, 488 (stating that the passage of the NHPA
reflected the third phase of historic preservation that “builds on elements of the past”).
28. Id. at 482.
29. See THE MOUNT VERNON LADIES’ ASS’N: A BRIEF HISTORY,
http://www.mountvernon.org/visit-his-estate/general-information/about-mount-vernon/mvla/history
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
30. See id. (providing an overview of the Mount Vernon Ladies Association history and
present-day involvement and educational efforts).
31. Rose, supra note 23, at 482.
By the act of [C]ongress approved August 1, 1888 (chapter 728), entitled “An act to
authorize condemnation of land for sites of public buildings and for other purposes,” it
is provided “that in every case in which the [S]ecretary of the [T]reasury, or any other
officer of the government, has been or hereafter shall be authorized to procure real
estate for the erection of a public building or for any other public uses, he shall be and
hereby is authorized to acquire the same for the United States by condemnation, under
judicial process, whenever in his opinion it is necessary or advantageous to the
government to do so.”
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efforts began in earnest. United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co. was
filed in response to an effort to block railway operations on the Gettysburg
Battlefield. 32 In ruling that a physical place-including its surroundings and
landscape–may be protected by Congress, the Court held that the use of eminent
domain for historic preservation is a public use. 33 Gettysburg Electric marked
the first time the Supreme Court upheld Congress’s powers to act to preserve an
important historic site. 34 In Gettysburg Electric, the Court stated:
Can it be that the government is without power to preserve the land, and properly
mark out the various sites upon which this struggle took place? Can it not erect
the monuments provided for by these acts of Congress, or even take possession of
the field of battle, in the name and for the benefit of all the citizens of the country,
for the present and for the future? Such a use seems necessarily not only a public
use, but one so closely connected with the welfare of the republic itself as to be
within the powers granted congress by the constitution for the purpose of
protecting and preserving the whole country. 35

Thus began judicial efforts to promote preservation efforts on home soil.
Historic preservation efforts were further energized under President
Theodore Roosevelt with the signing of the Antiquities Act in 1906. 36 The
Antiquities Act prohibits the excavation or destruction of antiquities from public
lands without a permit from the Secretary of Interior and authorizes the
President to declare lands owned or controlled by the federal government as
“national monuments,” thereby preserving them for future generations. 37 Like
Gettysburg Electric, 38 the Act focuses on the protection of physical, tangible
structures and objects stating:
[t]he President of the United States is hereby authorized, in his discretion, to
declare by public proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric
structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon
the lands owned or controlled by the Government of the United States to be
national monuments. 39

There are penalties for the appropriation of any “ruin,” “monument,” or
“object of antiquity.” 40 While these terms are not specifically defined within the
United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
32. Gettysburg Elec., 160 U.S. at 668 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 680-83 (emphasis added).
34. See J. Peter Byrne, Hallowed Ground: The Gettysburg Battlefield in Historic Preservation
Law, 22 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 203, 210 (2009).
35. Gettysburg Elec., 160 U.S. at 682 (emphasis added).
36. The Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–433 (2012). The Antiquities Act was passed in
response to vandalism at a historic Casa Grande ruin in Arizona as well as in response to renewed
attempts to preserve Mount Vernon. Marilyn Phelan, A Synopsis of the Laws Protecting Our
Cultural Heritage, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 63, 67 (1993).
37. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–432. Permits for “the excavation of archaeological sites, and the
gathering of objects of antiquity upon the lands under their respective jurisdictions may be granted
by the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, and War.” 16 U.S.C. § 432.
38. See Gettysburg Elec., 160 U.S. at 682.
39. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (emphasis added on “landmarks,” “structures,” and “objects”).
40. 16 U.S.C. § 433.
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Antiquities Act, they are all physical properties. The Antiquities Act is a success
story in its effective preservation of national treasures and is widely used by the
President today for preservation efforts. Indeed, President Obama recently
designated five new properties as national monuments pursuant to his authority
under the Antiquities Act. 41
Following the passage of the Antiquities Act, the National Park Service
was founded in 1916 42 and the Historic Sites Act was signed into law in 1935. 43
These developments focus on the preservation of physical properties including
sites, buildings, and objects like the Antiquities Act and Gettysburg Electric
before it. 44 The Historic Sites Act predates the NHPA’s modern National
Register. The Act states, “it is hereby declared that it is a national policy to
preserve for public use historic sites, buildings, and objects of national
significance for the inspiration and benefit of the people of the United States.”45
Under the Historic Sites Act, the Secretary of the Interior, through the National
Park Service, is authorized to “restore, reconstruct, rehabilitate, preserve, and
maintain historic or prehistoric sites, buildings, objects, and properties of
national historical or archaeological significance and, where deemed desirable,
establish and maintain museums in connection therewith.” 46 Thus, early
preservation efforts focused exclusively on tangible, physical properties.
Following World War II, President Truman signed the National Trust for
Historic Preservation Act in 1949, establishing a corporation to facilitate public
participation in the preservation of sites, buildings, and objects of national
significance or interest, with the express purpose “to receive donations of sites,
buildings, and objects significant in American history and culture, to preserve
and administer them for public benefit.” 47 Today, there are twenty-seven sites
designated as National Trust Historic Sites—most are buildings of historical
importance, including President Lincoln’s Cottage in Washington, D.C. and the
Touro Synagogue in Newport, Rhode Island. 48 Eleven years later, President
Eisenhower signed the Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act into law,
which borrowed language from earlier historic preservation laws with the
purpose of preserving “historic American sites, buildings, objects, and
antiquities of national significance.” 49

41. See Press Release, The White House, President Obama Designates Five New National
Monuments (Mar. 25, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/03/25/president-obama-designates-five-new-national-monuments.
42. See The National Park Service Organic Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
43. 16 U.S.C. §§ 461–67 (2012).
44. 16 U.S.C. § 461; see 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–433; United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R. Co., 160
U.S. 668, 682 (1896).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 461 (emphasis added).
46. 16 U.S.C. § 462(f) (emphasis added).
47. 16 U.S.C. § 468 (2012).
48. See NATIONAL TRUST FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION,
http://www.preservationnation.org/travel-and-sites/sites/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
49. 16 U.S.C. § 469 (2012).
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B. The National Historic Preservation Act Is Enacted: A Culmination of
Earlier Preservation Efforts
The origin of the NHPA is traceable to the administration of President
Lyndon Johnson and the beautification program administered by the First Lady,
Lady Bird Johnson. 50 This culminated with the passage of the NHPA in 1966.
Additionally, a 1965 U.S. Conference of Mayors Report, With Heritage So Rich,
focused on local and predominantly urban desires of major U.S. cities to
preserve historic buildings within historic districts. 51 Indeed, it was the
destruction of physical places by the federal highway regime that spurred
congressional action with the signing of the NHPA just one year after the
publication of With Heritage So Rich. The report recommended the creation of a
comprehensive national historic preservation program and, shortly thereafter, the
NHPA was enacted into law. 52
The NHPA’s purpose is to “give a sense of orientation to the American
people,” 53 reflecting preservationists’ desire not to feel lost within an urban
environment and the importance of distinctive architectural qualities to afford a
“sense of place.” 54 The NHPA accomplished this, in part, by providing a public
review and comment period prior to funding a federal activity that may impact
property on or eligible for inclusion on the National Register. 55 Executive Order
11,593 directs that the federal government “shall provide leadership in
preserving, restoring and maintaining the historic and cultural environment of
the Nation.” 56
The NHPA has three major components that affect federal activities: (1) a
“Section 106” procedural review to ensure federal agencies consider the effects
of activities on historic properties; (2) the continuation of a National Register of
Historic Places (derived from the earlier Historic Sites Act) that is routinely
updated via the Secretary of Interior; and (3) a “Section 110” requirement for
federal agencies to locate, inventory, and nominate properties that are within its
control to the National Register. 57

50. THOMAS F. KING, CULTURAL RESOURCE LAWS & PRACTICE (3d ed. 2008).
51. Rose, supra note 23, at 489.
52. KING, supra note 50, at 18. The conservation protections within Section 4(f) of the
Department of Transportation Act were also enacted by the same Congress.
53. 16 U.S.C. § 470(b)(2) (2012).
54. Rose, supra note 23, at 489–90.
55. 16 U.S.C. § 470f; Rose, supra note 23, at 526.
56. Exec. Order No. 11,593, 36 Fed. Reg. 8921 (May 13, 1971), reprinted as amended in 16
U.S.C. § 470 (2012).
57. MILLER, supra note 25, at 5.

398

BERKELEY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
1.

[Vol. 32:2

Section 106 Review Process and NHPA’s Relationship with the
National Environmental Policy Act

First, the NHPA includes “National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)like” 58 procedural requirements commonly known as the “Section 106” review
process. 59 This is similar to the detailed environmental impact statements and
assessments required by NEPA. 60 The Section 106 process is the regulatory
heart of the NHPA and analogous to the NEPA’s procedural environmental
impact statement (EIS) requirement whereby DoD, as a federal agency, must
comply with NEPA’s requirements. 61 Similarly, the NHPA requires federal
agencies to take into account a project’s effects on historic properties listed in,
or eligible for listing in, the National Register of Historic Places prior to
funding, licensing, or otherwise proceeding with projects. 62 It states:
The head of any Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over a
proposed Federal or federally assisted undertaking in any State and the head of
any Federal department or independent agency having authority to license any
undertaking shall, prior to the approval of the expenditure of any Federal funds on
the undertaking or prior to the issuance of any license, as the case may be, take
into account the effect of the undertaking on any district, site, building, structure,
or object that is included in or eligible for inclusion in the National Register. 63

These five classifications of properties (district, site, building, structure, or
object) are repeated throughout the NHPA statutory scheme and are mirrored in
the definition of “historic properties” within the NHPA. 64 The NHPA builds
upon the “sites, buildings, and objects” language found in the Historic Sites Act
adding “district” and “structure” to its definition of historic properties. 65 While
property is not specifically defined in the NHPA, historic property or historic
resource is defined as follows: “[h]istoric property or historic resource means
any prehistoric or historic district, site, building, structure, or object included in,
or eligible for inclusion on the National Register, including artifacts, records,
and material remains related to such a property or resource.” 66 The language of
the NHPA continues to emphasize physical property.
This provision effectively directs all federal agencies, including the DoD to
make an independent determination whether properties listed or eligible for

58. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331, 4335, 4343
(2012).
59. 16 U.S.C. § 470f. Section 106 refers to the relevant provision within the NHPA statutory
construct. It does not have any relation to the actual statutory citation within Title 16 (i.e. Section
106 does not equate to 16 U.S.C. § 106).
60. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4375 (2012).
61. MILLER, supra note 25, at 5.
62. 16 U.S.C. § 470f.
63. Id. (emphasis added to show the five types of properties that the NHPA protects).
64. 16 U.S.C. § 470w(5).
65. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–33 (2012). Arguably, it only added “district” to the historic preservation
lexicon as “structure” was protected pursuant to The Antiquities Act.
66. 16 U.S.C. § 470w(5).
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listing in the National Register will be adversely affected prior to the initiation
of a federal “undertaking.” 67 If a proposal appears to affect a property listed on
the National Register, the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation—an
independent federal agency—is given the opportunity to provide further
comment. 68
The NHPA is fundamentally procedural in nature. “While Section 106 is an
effective tool in focusing attention on federal agency actions affecting historic
resources, it does not prevent federal agencies from taking actions that
ultimately harm historic resources.” 69 The NHPA requires that the relevant
federal agency identify historic resources and explore alternative measures to
mitigate or avoid the harm the project would have on the buildings. 70 But the
NHPA does not ultimately prevent the demolition of a property on the National
Register, though the federal agency must properly “take into account” the effect
of this action on the historic property. 71
2.

Section 101: The Evolution of the U.S. National Register

Second, Section 101 of the NHPA authorizes the expansion and
maintenance of the National Register of Historic Places. 72 The National
Register was established under the Historic Sites Act in 1935 73 and was
effectively expanded by the passage of the NHPA. 74 Similar to the Section 106
provision, the National Register designates the properties eligible for placement
within the NHPA as, “districts, sites, buildings, structures, and objects
significant in American history, architecture, archeology, and culture.” 75 The
National Register is limited to five categories of historic properties (districts,
sites, buildings, structures, or objects). 76 The National Register authorizes the
67. MILLER, supra note 25, at 5. Undertaking is defined broadly in the NHPA: “Undertaking
means a project, activity, or program funded in whole or in part under the direct or indirect
jurisdiction of a Federal agency, including —
A. those carried out by or on behalf of the agency;
B. those carried out with Federal financial assistance;
C. those requiring a Federal permit license, or approval; and
D. those subject to State or local regulation administered pursuant to a
delegation or approval by a Federal agency.” 16 U.S.C. § 470(w)(7).
68. MILLER, supra note 25, at 5.
69. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
70. Id.
71. 16 U.S.C. § 470f.
72. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(1)(A).
73. MILLER, supra note 25, at 2.
74. National Historic Sites Act of 1935, 16 U.S.C. §§ 461–467 (2012); see also MILLER,
supra note 25, at 2.
75. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
76. The regulation specifies eligible properties as follows:
National Register criteria for evaluation. The quality of significance in American
history, architecture, archeology, engineering, and culture is present in districts, sites,
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Secretary of the Interior to add historic properties “and objects significant in
American history, architecture, archeology, engineering and culture.” 77
In assessing the five categories of historic properties (districts, sites,
buildings, structures, and objects), the National Register utilizes the following
definitions. A district is defined as a “geographically definable area, urban or
rural, possessing a significant concentration, linkage or continuity of sites,
buildings structures, or objects united by past events or aesthetically by plan or
physical development. A district may also comprise individual elements
separated geographically but linked by association or history.” 78 An example is
the Georgetown Historic District in Washington, D.C. 79
A site is the “location of a significant event, a prehistoric or historic
occupation or activity, or a building or structure, whether standing, ruined, or
vanished, where the location itself maintains historical or archeological value
regardless of the value of the existing structure.” 80 A regulatory example of sites
listed on the National Register is the Mud Springs Pony Express Station Site in
Dalton, Nebraska. 81
A building is defined as “a structure created to shelter any form of human
activity, such as a house, barn, church, hotel or similar structure. Building may
refer to a historically related complex such as a courthouse and jail or a house
and barn.” 82 Examples of buildings on the National Register include the Molly
Brown House in Denver, Colorado and the Fairntosh Plantation in Durham,
North Carolina. 83
buildings, structures, and objects that possess integrity of location, design, setting,
materials, workmanship, feeling, and association, and
(a) that are associated with events that have made a significant
contribution to the broad patterns of our history; or
(b) that are associated with the lives of persons significant in our past; or
(c) that embody the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method
of construction, or that represent the work of a master, or that possess
high artistic values, or that represent a significant and distinguishable
entity whose components may lack individual distinction; or
(d) that have yielded, or may be likely to yield, information important in
prehistory or history.
Criteria considerations. Ordinarily cemeteries, birthplaces, or graves of historical
figures, properties owned by religious institutions or used for religious purposes,
structures that have been moved from their original locations, reconstructed historic
buildings, properties primarily commemorative in nature, and properties that have
achieved significance within the past 50 years shall not be considered eligible for the
National Register.
36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2012).
77. 36 C.F.R. § 60.1.
78. 36 C.F.R. § 60.3(d).
79. Id.
80. 36 C.F.R. § 60.3(l).
81. Id.
82. 36 C.F.R. § 60.3(a).
83. Id.
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A structure is defined as a “work made up of interdependent and
interrelated parts of a definite pattern of organization. Constructed by man, it is
often an engineering project large in scale.” 84 An example of a structure on the
National Register is the Old Point Loma Lighthouse in San Diego, California. 85
Lastly, the regulatory definition of object is of particular significance as it
took on central importance in the Dugong rulings. “Object,” too, is addressed in
prior preservation statutes like the Antiquities Act and the Historic Sites Act. 86
Object is defined under NHPA regulations as a “material thing of functional,
aesthetic, cultural, historical or scientific value that may be, by nature or design,
movable yet related to a specific setting or environment.” 87 While an object may
be movable and seemingly expands the traditional definition of properties, it still
must be a “material thing.” 88 And the examples of protected “objects” within
federal regulations are instructive: they are all of a physical nature. Indeed, the
regulatory examples provided are the Adams Memorial in Rock Creek Cemetery
in Washington, D.C., the Sumpter Gold Dredge in Oregon, and the Delta Queen
Steamboat in Cincinnati, Ohio. 89
Clearly, there is a high degree of care in categorizing properties of historic
value on the National Register. Today, more than 88,000 properties are currently
on the National Register and it is continuously updated. 90 Nevertheless, the
properties all share one commonality: they are all physical or tangible in nature.
Aand living animals are completely absent from the U.S. National Register. This
is perhaps not surprising, as animals and living organisms are afforded legal
protections pursuant to the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA) and the
Endangered Species Act (ESA), as discussed in greater detail below.
3.

Section 110: Historic Properties Within Federal Control

Lastly, the NHPA places special requirements on each federal agency
regarding the management of historic properties within its ownership or
control. 91 Each agency is required to utilize historic properties under its control

84. 36 C.F.R. § 60.3(p).
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 432 (2012).
87. 36 C.F.R. § 60.3(j).
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See generally National Registry of Historic Places: Research, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE,
http://www.nps.gov/nr/research/index.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2014) (providing an up-to-date list of
the number of historic places on the National Register). A searchable database of properties listed on
the National Register is available at
http://nrhp.focus.nps.gov/natreghome.do?searchtype=natreghome (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
91. 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2(a)(1)–(2) (2008). This is commonly referred to as the Section 110
process. “The heads of all Federal agencies shall assume responsibility for the preservation of
historic properties which are owned or controlled by such agency.” Id.
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“to the maximum extent feasible” 92 and identify, evaluate, and nominate
potential properties to the National Register via the Secretary of Interior. 93
The table below demonstrates the gradual evolution of historic preservation
law and its applicability.

92. Id.
93. Id. Under the NHPA statutory construct, there are express exemption clauses that could
apply to a DoD “undertaking.” For example, compliance with the NHPA may be waived in the event
of a “major national disaster” or “imminent threat to the national security.” 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2(j).
The full text reads, “The Secretary shall promulgate regulations under which the requirements of this
section may be waived in whole or in part in the event of a major natural disaster or an imminent
threat to the national security.” Id. It appears that there has not been widespread use of these
exemption clauses.
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Table 1
Statute/Case

Applicability

Gettysburg Electric
(1896)

Monuments and lands
(“fieldof battle”) 94
Historic landmarks, historic
and prehistoric structures,
and other objects
Historic or prehistoric sites,
buildings, objects, and
properties of national
historical or archaeological
significance

Antiquities Act
(1906)

Historic Sites Act
(1935)
National Trust for
Historic
Preservation Act
(1949)
NHPA—original
text (1966)

NHPA—present
day with 1980
amendments
(discussed infra)

Sites, buildings and objects
significant in American
history and culture
District, site, building,
structure, or object included
in or eligible for inclusion in
the National Register
District, site, building,
structure, or object included
in or eligible for inclusion in
the National Register and
property on the applicable
country’s equivalent of the
National Register

Extraterritorial
Application?
No
No

No

No

No

Yes 95

C. The World Heritage Convention and the NHPA’s 1980 Implementing
Amendment
In 1972, six years following the signing of the NHPA, the United States led
the world’s efforts to sign the WHC. 96 The United States became the first
ratifying state in 1973, 97 and the WHC entered into force in 1975. 98 Today, the
WHC is a success story as it has been ratified by more than 190 nations. 99

94. United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2; Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
96.
The full title is, “Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage.” WHC, supra note 21.
97. The Convention entered into force in 1975. See generally Emily Monteith, Comment, Lost
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The WHC’s purpose is to promote the “identification, protection, and
preservation, of cultural and natural heritage around the world considered to be
of outstanding value to humanity.” 100 It provides that “certain natural and
cultural sites can be designated as world heritages and conserved for future
generations.” 101 It does this primarily through the creation of the World
Heritage List that provides for a variety of incentives and disincentives for
individual nations to protect historical properties, a system referred to by one
scholar as “compliance pull.” 102 While the public may know, generally, that
there are certain protections afforded to World Heritage Sites, the actual process
and jurisdiction to regulate under the WHC is less well known. 103 It is the
responsibility of each state party to the WHC to identify properties situated in its
territory for inclusion on the World Heritage List and then take steps to protect
and report on the condition of protected properties. 104
The WHC protects properties of a “natural and cultural heritage.” 105 The
WHC defines cultural heritage in Article 1; it is similar to the NHPA’s focus on
physical, tangible properties. It reads:
(a) monuments: architectural works, works of monumental sculpture and
painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature,
inscriptions, cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of
outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or
science;
(b) groups of buildings: groups of separate or connected buildings which,
because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the
landscape, are of outstanding universal value from the point of view of
history, art or science;
(c) sites: works of man or the combined works of nature and man, and
areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding universal
value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological
point of view. 106

Similar to other U.S. statutes, the WHC also protects natural heritage
properties, once again not expressly including animals as part of its

in Translation: Discerning the International Equivalent of the National Register of Historic Places,
59 DEPAUL L. REV. 1017, 1020–24 (2010) (describing the U.S. involvement and leadership role in
the WHC’s ratification).
98. UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CENTER, STATE PARTIES, AND RATIFICATION STATUS,
available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties (last visited Mar. 6, 2014) (providing an up-todate listing of the 190 parties to the WHC).
99. Id.
100. WHC, supra note 21, pmbl.
101. EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 1117
(2d ed. 2007) (emphasis added).
102. Edward J. Goodwin, The World Heritage Convention, the Environment, and Compliance,
20 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 157, 161 (2009).
103. Id.
104. WHC, supra note 21, at art. 3.
105. Id., arts. 1, 2.
106. Id., art. 1.
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definition. 107 Natural heritage properties are defined in Article 2 with the
following considered “natural heritage”:
(a) natural features consisting of physical and biological formations or
groups of such formations, which are of outstanding universal value
from the aesthetic or scientific point of view;
(b) geological and physiographical formations and precisely delineated
areas which constitute the habitat of threatened species of animals and
plants of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science
or conservation;
(c) natural sites or precisely delineated natural areas of outstanding
universal value from the point of view of science, conservation or
natural beauty. 108

Article 2 protects features, formations, areas, and sites. While there is an
acknowledgement that the habitat of “threatened species of animals and plants
of outstanding universal value” are subject to WHC protection, the WHC does
not protect animals as such. 109 Indeed, while animals would be the unquestioned
beneficiaries of having their habitats protected, the WHC does not specifically
afford protections to living animals. For example, under Article 2, the WHC
only protects the “geological and physiological formations” and “precisely
delineated areas,” 110 which constitute the habitat of threatened species of
animals. 111
Animals are excluded under the WHC’s Operational Guidelines, which
provide guidance on the WHC’s practical implementation; properties of a
“moveable heritage” are not protected. 112 Even properties that are immovable,
but may eventually be movable will not be considered for protection under the
WHC. 113 Not surprisingly, as of this writing, the dugong is not on the World
Heritage List and there are no living animals or objects currently on the World
Heritage List. 114 There are numerous natural sites that are protected by the
WHC that include the habitats of animals of enormous interest. To use one
example, the Great Barrier Reef is on the World Heritage List, and it includes
the habitats of animals including the dugong and sea turtles. 115 It also includes a
great variety of coral, shellfish, and sea life. All of these natural characteristics
are important factors in determining the Great Barrier Reef’s inclusion in
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id., art. 2 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
UN Educ. Scientific & Cultural Org. (UNESCO), OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE WORLD HERITAGE CONVENTION, WHC 11/01, available at
http://whc.unesco.org/archive/opguide12-en.pdf [hereinafter OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES] (last
visited Mar. 8, 2014); cf. Goodwin, supra note 102, at 162 (highlighting that the WHC Operational
Guidelines serve as a “compliance pull” mechanism for state parties).
113. OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES, supra note 112, at 14.
114. Id.
World
Heritage
List,
UNESCO, available
at
115. Great
Barrier
Reef,
http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/154 (last visited Mar. 6, 2014).
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accordance with the WHC and its Operational Guidelines. But the sea turtle and
dugong are not protected under the WHC wherever they exist and in Henoko
Bay. They merely benefit from its protections when inhabiting the Great Barrier
Reef and similarly protected natural properties.
Under Article 3 of the WHC, each party is to identify and delineate the
different properties meeting the definition of cultural and natural heritage. 116
Article 4 provides that it is the duty of each state party “[to ensure] the
identification, protection, conservation, presentation, and transmission to future
generations of the cultural and natural heritage referred to in [A]rticles 1 and 2
and situated on its territory.” 117
Lastly, under Article 5, each state party “shall endeavor to take the
appropriate legal, scientific, technical, administrative and financial measures
necessary for the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and
rehabilitation of this heritage.” 118 This language is particularly important, as it
highlights the WHC’s status as a non-self-executing treaty, requiring that
Congress adopt implementing language within federal law to formally
implement the WHC’s treaty requirements.
Similar to the NHPA, within the United States, the Secretary of Interior has
the special role of periodically nominating properties of international
significance for placement on the World Heritage List. 119 Once a property is
identified as meeting the Article 1 and 2 definitions of cultural and natural
heritage, each party has obligations to protect that site, and the site can be
nominated to the World Heritage List. 120 Scholars have argued that there are
certain political, tourism, and financial assistance benefits from the inclusion of
sites on the World Heritage List. 121
116. WHC, supra note 21, at art. 3.
117. Id., art. 4.
118. Id., art. 5(d). While there is a paucity of judicial opinions interpreting whether the general
obligations set forth in Articles 4 and 5 amount to a prescriptive legal obligation for states, at least
one national court in Australia has stated the Convention imposes a legal duty to protect sites on the
World Heritage List. See WEISS ET AL., supra note 101, at 1121 (quoting the majority opinion from
the Australian High Court in Australia v. The State of Tasmania upholding Australia’s legal duty to
protect the Western Tasmania Wilderness National Park, a site on the World Heritage List).
119. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-1(b) (2012). The full text of the provision reads as follows:
The Secretary of the Interior shall periodically nominate properties he determines are
of international significance to the World Heritage Committee on behalf of the United
States. No property may be so nominated unless it has previously been determined to
be of national significance. Each such nomination shall include evidence of such legal
protections as may be necessary to ensure preservation of the property and its
environment (including restrictive covenants, easements, or other forms of protection).
Before making any such nomination, the Secretary shall notify the Committee on
Natural Resources of the United States House of Representatives and the Committee
on Energy and Natural Resources of the United States Senate.
Id.
120. See Goodwin, supra note 102, at 163. The terms “World Heritage List” and “World
Heritage Site” are used synonymously.
121. See id. at 167–71.
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Like the NHPA’s National Register, the WHC is a “living treaty” and
properties are continually added to and deleted from the World Heritage List. As
of this writing, there are 981 properties on the World Heritage List that are
considered to have outstanding universal value in accordance with the WHC
guidelines. This includes twenty-one World Heritage properties in the United
States and seventeen in Japan. 122 Of the 981 properties, 759 are classified as
“cultural,” 193 are classified as “natural,” and twenty-nine are classified as
“mixed cultural/natural.” 123 For example, in the United States there are twentyone World Heritage Sites including the Statute of Liberty and Yosemite
National Park. Papahonaumokuakea National Monument in Hawaii is the most
recent U.S. addition in 2010. 124 As a living animal does not clearly fit into the
definition of a property of cultural or natural heritage, none of the properties on
the World Heritage List are wild animals.
There are seventeen protected World Heritage Sites in Japan. 125 The
seventeen sites include the Buddhist Monuments in Horyu-ji and the Ogasawara
Islands. 126 Absent from the World Heritage List are wild animals, and the
dugong is not a World Heritage Site, nor is the dugong’s habitat on the World
Heritage List. 127
D. The Merger of the WHC and the NHPA: Implementing Statutory
Language Within the NHPA Muddies the Waters
In 1980, five years after the WHC entered into force, Congress amended
U.S. law to address its treaty obligations, using the NHPA as its implementing
statutory vehicle. By implementing language from the WHC into the NHPA, the
NHPA is the only U.S. natural resource or environmental statute 128 with a

122. Current U.S. properties include Yosemite National Park, Monticello and the University of
Virginia in Charlottesville, and Chaco (Pueblo) Culture. For an updated list, see United States of
America, The States Parties, UNESCO, available at http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/us (last
visited Mar. 6, 2014).
123. Id.
124. Id. Of the twenty-one sites in the United States., eight are cultural properties (e.g. the
Statue of Liberty), twelve are natural properties (e.g. Yosemite) and one is a mixed cultural/natural
(Papahonaumokuakea National Monument).
125. Japan, The States Parties, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/statesparties/jp (last visited
Mar. 6, 2014).
126. Id. Of the seventeen Japanese World Heritage Sites, thirteen are cultural properties and
four are natural properties. The natural properties do include the habitats of endangered species, but
Henoko Bay is not a World Heritage Site. Id.
127. Id.
128. This Article uses the term “natural resource” or “environmental” here to reflect the
numerous U.S. laws that could be construed to provide environmental protections. As such, it
includes obvious environmental examples such as NEPA and the Clean Water Act, but also natural
resource statutes to include the Sikes Act and the Antiquities Act. See Sikes Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 670–
670o (2012); Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–433 (2012).
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jurisdictional provision construed by a federal court to apply in another
sovereign nation. 129 The WHC’s implementing amendment to the NHPA states:
[p]rior to the approval of any Federal undertaking outside the United States which
may directly and adversely affect a property which is on the World Heritage List
or on the applicable country’s equivalent of the National Register, the head of a
Federal agency having direct or indirect jurisdiction over such undertaking shall
take into account the effect of the undertaking on such property for purposes of
avoiding or mitigating any adverse effects. 130

This implementing language mirrors the NHPA’s domestic “NEPA-like”
review process with the requirement that a federal agency must account for a
proposed undertaking’s effects on properties on the World Heritage List or the
applicable country’s equivalent National Register. 131 Unfortunately, there is no
substantive legislative history for this provision to discern Congress’s intent
with respect to the true scope of this implementing provision. 132 The key terms
are “equivalent of the National Register” and “such property.” These terms
require federal agencies to “take into account” the proposed undertakings effects
on both the World Heritage List properties and the National Register equivalent
law of the host nation. 133 But there is little additional guidance on how,
precisely, this extraterritorial provision should be construed and practically
applied. 134 Section 110 of the NHPA established federal agency responsibilities
and Section 101(g) requires the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate
guidelines for federal agency responsibilities under the Act. The Secretary of the
Interior did so in 1998, but made clear that these guidelines, oddly, had “no
regulatory effect” and were merely issued to meet the Section 110
requirements. 135 Hence, there is an absence of clarifying legislative history or
binding administrative regulations and guidance associated with these 1980
amendments. This extraterritorial provision of the NHPA was largely unnoticed
129. See Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2008). As discussed infra, Part III.B, the
ESA and the MMPA have been interpreted to apply outside the United States to include the high
seas, but neither has been interpreted to apply in another sovereign nation, thus invoking larger
foreign policy concerns.
130. Id. at 1088 (emphasis added).
131. See id.
132. H.R. Rep. No. 96-1457, at 16–17 (1980). The House Report concerning the 1980
amendment merely restates the existing condition with no additional Congressional discussion.
133. 16 U.S.C. § 470(a)(2).
134. In 1998, eighteen years after the WHC implementing language was passed, the U.S.
Secretary of the Interior provided additional guidance to federal agencies on how to apply the NHPA
overseas that was of little assistance. This guidance stated, “the agency’s preservation program
should ensure that, when carrying out work in other countries, the agency will consider the effects of
such actions on historic properties, including World Heritage Sites and properties that are eligible for
inclusion in the host country’s equivalent of the National Register.” The Secretary of the Interior’s
Standards and Guidelines for Federal Agency Historic Preservation Programs Pursuant to the
National Historic Preservation Act, 63 Fed. Reg. 20,496, 20,503 (Apr. 24, 1998) (noting that
“[e]fforts to identify and consider effects on historic properties in other countries should be carried
out in consultation with the host country’s historic preservation authorities, with affected
communities and groups, and with relevant professional organizations”).
135. See 63 Fed. Reg. 20496-20508, 20496 (Apr. 24, 1998).
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and effectively lay dormant for twenty-five years until a lawsuit was filed to
protect the dugong. 136
Table 2 summarizes the scope of the NHPA, the WHC, and the WHC’s
implementing language within the NHPA, displaying surprising results.
Table 2

Statute or Treaty

Applicability

Provides
Protection for
Living Animals
and Objects?

NHPA (1966: pre-WHC
and 1980 amendments)

District, site, building,
structure, or object

No 137

World Heritage
Convention (ratified in
1975)

Monuments, groups of
buildings, features, areas,
formations and sites

No? 138

NHPA (to include 1980
WHC amendments)

District, site, building,
structure, or object and “the
applicable country’s
equivalent of the National
Register” 139

Yes? 140

II.
THE NHPA’S EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION IN PRACTICE
A. Background: The Marines in Japan, Japanese Cultural Properties
Law, and the Absence of Japanese Judicial Remedies
The United States has a long history of military activities in Japan dating
back to World War II. 141 For example, the island of Okinawa, located 1,000
136. See Dugong I, No. C 03-4350 MHP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3123 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2,
2005).
137 Not as practically applied. Living animals are absent from the National Register. But see
King Decl. ¶¶ 9–10, Dugong I, No. C 03-4350 MHP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3123 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
2, 2005) (asserting that while living animals are not on the National Register this is not, by itself
dispositive, and the NHPA could still protect living animals).
138 See WHC, supra note 21, at art. 2. While a WHC natural property does not include a wild
animal under the definition of the WHC and its Operational Guidelines, the property may include the
habitat of threatened species of animals and plants of outstanding universal value from the point of
view of science or conservation. Id. at art. 2(b).
139 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2.
140 See Dugong I, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3123; Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084 (N.D.
Cal. 2008), discussed infra part II.
141. For a good overview of the military background and issues discussed herein, see
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miles southwest of Tokyo, was the site of a major military battle with over
200,000 casualties in World War II and is today home to thousands of American
servicemen. The United States ceded administrative control of Okinawa to Japan
in 1972 and Japan has full responsibility and authority today “for the exercise of
any and all powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction [of
Okinawa].” 142
Yet the DoD operates a number of military bases on Okinawa to this day,
including the Marine Corps’ Futenma Air Station. This air station is completely
surrounded by urban development. Japan faces the continual threat of North
Korean provocations, including repeated missile launches in the Sea of Japan
and nuclear tests. 143
To address several concerns related to the U.S. military presence in
Okinawa, a joint United States-Japan Special Action Committee on Okinawa
was created to explore alternative sites for Futenma. This was due, in part, to
protests by Okinawan residents against the U.S. military presence. 144 As part of
the selection process, the United States would establish operational parameters
for any replacement facility, but Japan would, “select the ultimate site of the
[replacement air station] and fund and carry out its construction.” 145
While the DoD would oversee the construction to ensure that its
operational requirements were met and operate the facility on a day-to-day basis
once built, the new air station would be placed in the sovereign territory of
Japan in a location ultimately selected by the Japanese government. 146
The United States and the central Japanese government focused on building
a sea-based facility off the shores of Henoko, an area rich in marine ecology and
the habitat of the dugong, a marine mammal protected under the Japanese Law

Takahashi, supra note 6.
142. Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1084; see also Laura Jensen Schoenbaum, Comment, The
Okinawa Dugong and the Creative Application of U.S. Extraterritorial Environmental Law, 44 TEX.
INT’L L.J. 457, 461 (2009).
143. See Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1085. Since the Dugong litigation, the national security
situation with North Korea has been tense. Kim Jong-un, the new Supreme Leader of North Korea,
has routinely conducted rocket tests within range of Japan and has been suspected of conducting
nuclear tests. See, e.g., David Sanger and Choe Sang-Hun, North Korea Confirms it Conducted
Third Nuclear Test, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2013, at A1.
144. Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1085. This joint committee, entitled the Special Action
Committee on Okinawa (SACO), issued a report in 1996 with recommendations to ease the burden
on the people of Okinawa and thereby strengthen the Japan-United States alliance. It specifically
recommended that the United States return twenty-one percent of its land back to Japan. One part of
the land return was the Marine Corps’s Futenma Air Station located in central Okinawa.
145. See id. For a more detailed analysis, see SACO Final Report on Futenma Air Station,
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF JAPAN, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/namerica/us/security/96saco2.html (Dec. 2, 1996) (providing an overview of the SACO’s
recommendations to include a history of deliberations). This lengthy process of the United States
and Japan working to find a solution for the replacement air station was politically and
diplomatically sensitive.
146. Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1085.
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on Cultural Property. 147 The dugong has significant meaning in Japanese culture
and small populations of dugongs inhabit the shallow waters of Henoko Bay. 148
After several years of negotiations, a “Roadmap for Re-alignment
Implementation” was signed between the United States and Japan, with the plan
to move Futenma Air Station to Henoko Bay. Many local Okinawans welcomed
the recommendation as the Futenma Air Station is a source of noise pollution
and there is a constant threat of aircraft-related mishaps. 149
Japan’s Cultural Properties Protection Law (Bunkazai hogohō) is
comprehensive and includes broad protections for a wide range of properties
like wild animals. 150 It includes both protections seen in U.S. domestic law
within the ESA or the MMPA, and more expansive protections not contemplated
by the MMPA, the ESA, or the NHPA. 151 For example, the “monuments”
definition of Japanese protected cultural properties within Japanese law includes
a diverse mixture of property types including “man-made and natural sites as
well as plants and animals.” 152 The “monument” definition in the WHC—the
underlying basis for the Dugong lawsuits—defines monument to include
tangible, physical properties, among them architectural works, sculptures, and
paintings. 153 So, the Japanese definition of monument includes properties that
are more expansive than what is found in the WHC. For other categories of
protection (e.g. “intangible folk cultural properties”), there is simply no U.S.
equivalent in any federal statute. In Japan, the dugong is protected as a “natural
monument” and is listed on the Japanese Register of Cultural Properties.154
There is no mention of “monument” within the NHPA 155 and “monument” in
147. Id. at 1084.
148. Id.
149. See Takahashi, supra note 6, at 187.
150. See Bunkazai Hogohō [Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties] C. Civ. 214, art. 1
(2007) (Japan.); see also Barbara Thornbury, The Cultural Properties Protection Law and Japan’s
Folk Performing Arts, 53 ASIAN FOLKLORE STUDIES, 211, 211–25 (1994) (discussing Japan’s
Cultural Property Law as it relates to intangible cultural properties).
151. For example, the Japanese Cultural Properties Protection Law provides protections for
intangible folk cultural properties.
152. Thornbury, supra note 150, at 212 n.2.
153. The full definition of “monument” under the WHC includes architectural works, works of
monumental sculpture and painting, elements or structures of an archaeological nature inscriptions,
cave dwellings and combinations of features, which are of outstanding value from the point of view
of history, are or science. See WHC, supra note 21, at art. 1.
154. Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1084 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
155. See The Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–433 (2012). The Antiquities Act does provide
protections for national monuments, but this is limited to lands owned by the United States and has
no applicability in the case of the dugong:
The President of the United States is authorized, in his discretion, to declare by public
proclamation historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects
of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon the lands owned or controlled by
the Government of the United States to be national monuments, and may reserve as a
part thereof parcels of land, the limits of which in all cases shall be confined to the
smallest area compatible with proper care and management of the objects to be
protected.
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the WHC applies to cultural heritage properties without reference to wild
animals. 156 While the United States does list the dugong as an endangered
species pursuant to the ESA, as discussed infra, Part III.B, the ESA could not be
used to protect the dugong in Japan. 157 These differences between Japanese and
U.S. domestic law highlight the inherent difficulty of applying the domestic law
of one nation within another nation’s territory. This is only exacerbated when
international treaty obligations overlap.
As the plans progressed to move the Marines away from Futenma, Japanese
citizens were concerned about the impact of the move from Futenma to Henoko
on the dugong. They turned to the Japanese courts for redress. However,
Japanese litigants lacked standing to bring a suit in Japanese courts challenging
the Japanese government’s decision to move the Marine Air Station to Henoko,
as Japanese domestic environmental law provided no such legal remedy. 158
The lack of a judicial remedy available from Japanese environmental and
administrative law made U.S. courts the last resort for judicial intervention by
all concerned parties in both Japan and the United States. 159 While the NHPA
lacks a specific citizen suit provision within its statutory scheme, Japanese
citizens were able to join with U.S. environmental groups to seek judicial review
of the DoD’s “agency action” pursuant to the APA when the litigants—to
include Japanese citizens—jointly filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California. 160
The Japanese litigants sought redress in a U.S. federal court, highlighting
the power of the NHPA when used in conjunction with the APA for judicial
redress. 161 The district court issued two opinions in 2005 and 2008, both times
addressing the challenge under the NHPA and the APA and embracing an
expansive view of the NHPA’s extraterritorial application. 162
B. Dugong v. Rumsfeld (Dugong I)
In 2005, the court in Dugong I rejected a motion to dismiss filed by the
U.S. government. 163 In Dugong I, the court ruled the Futenma relocation
16 U.S.C. § 431.
156. WHC, supra note 21, at art. 1.
157. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 581–82 (1992) (addressing the
extraterritorial limits of the ESA to not apply in foreign countries).
158. Takahashi, supra note 6, at 190.
159. Cf. Bob Egelko, Imperiled Mammal Threatened by Plan for Okinawa Base Court in S.F.
Hears Activists Advocate Applying U.S. Law, THE S. F. CHRONICLE, Aug. 5, 2004 at B4.
160. Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
161. The APA authorizes judicial review of agency actions “for which there is no other
adequate remedy in court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). As the NHPA lacks a citizen suit provision within
the statutory scheme, the APA was the only vehicle to bring litigation in asserting that the federal
agency (DoD) had improperly applied the NHPA.
162. As discussed in footnote 4, “Dugong rulings” will be used generally to refer to the rulings
in Dugong I and Dugong II.
163. Dugong I, No. C 03-4350 MHP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3123, at *67 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2,
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qualified as a “federal undertaking” within the meaning of the NHPA, and it
permitted the plaintiffs’ challenge to continue for three reasons. 164
First, the court ruled Japan’s Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties
was the equivalent of the U.S. National Register within the meaning of Section
402 of the NHPA. 165 In dismissing the government’s argument that the
Japanese law was not the equivalent to the U.S. National Register, the court
noted the presence of animals on the World Heritage List would have strongly
indicated Congress’s intent to protect wild animals, but the absence of animals
on the World Heritage List was not, by itself, dispositive. 166 The court stated:
[A]n interpretation of [Section 402] requiring that the foreign list be identical to
the American one would . . . contradict the international aspect of the section. To
require that foreign lists include only those types of resources which are of
cultural significance in the United States would defy the basic proposition that
just as cultures vary, so too will their equivalent legislative efforts to preserve
their culture. 167

The court dismissed the more limited approach that the NHPA applies to
reasonably related or intersecting properties jointly protected by the U.S. and
Japanese registers. Under Japanese law, there is some overlap with the types of
properties covered under the NHPA. For example, both Japanese and American
laws cover tangible structures, ancient sites, and traditional buildings. But the
Japanese Law for the Protection of Cultural Properties’ Register—determined to
be “equivalent of” the U.S. National Register—has a more expansive protection
of properties including physical sites and locations (e.g. ancient sites and places
of scenic beauty), intangible properties (e.g. music, manners and customs, and
folk performing arts and techniques), as well as physical properties that are
similar to what can be protected under the U.S. National Registry. 168 The court
effectively read the NHPA’s extraterritorial provision to protect all Japanese
protected properties as defined by Japanese law, regardless of their overlap and
nexus to U.S. properties.
Second, the court in Dugong I specifically ruled that the dugong could be
protected as a “property” within the NHPA statutory scheme. 169 While noting
that the dugong is a wild animal not within the traditional U.S. “property”
definition as understood by the NHPA, the court stated that there is little
precedent whether a “living thing can constitute a property eligible for the U.S.
National Register.” 170
The court relied upon another district court case, Hatmaker v. Georgia
Department of Transportation, where the court held that an oak tree was at least
2005).
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at *40.
16 U.S.C. § 470a-2.
Dugong I, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3123, at *26.
Id. at *22.
Schoenbaum, supra note 142.
Dugong I, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3123, at *27.
Id. at *33.
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potentially eligible for inclusion on the National Register. 171 Hatmaker stands
out as a unique case holding that the National Register could feasibly include
protections for a living object. 172 The court said the dugong, like an oak tree,
may fall under the NHPA’s definition of object—a “material thing of functional,
aesthetic, cultural, historical, or scientific value that may be, by nature of design,
movable yet related to a specific setting or environment.” 173 Yet objects have
been protected in American preservation law since the Antiquities Act. While
the NHPA added districts to its five protected property categories in 1966,
objects have been identified as a protected property in three prior historic
preservation statutes: The Antiquities Act, Historic Sites Act, and National Trust
for Historic Preservation Act.
Third, the court addressed the government’s concerns related to broader
foreign policy considerations found in the act of state doctrine. 174 The act of
state doctrine was first articulated in Underhill v. Hernandez in 1897. 175 In
Underhill, a U.S. citizen brought an action to recover damages against General
Hernandez, a Venezuelan military officer, when Hernandez refused Underhill’s
request to leave the country. 176 Hernandez was a member of the “Crespo
government,” the former government of Venezuela as recognized by the United
States. In dismissing Underhill’s claim the Supreme Court famously stated,
“[e]very sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts
of another, done within its own territory.” 177 Underhill signified the emergence
of the act of state doctrine in American jurisprudence when deciphering whether
the judiciary should rule upon another sovereign’s acts, a practice that has only
been reaffirmed. 178
In modern jurisprudence, the act of state doctrine bars an action “only if:
(1) there is an official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own
territory; and (2) the relief sought or the defense interposed [in the action would
require] a court in the United States to declare invalid the [foreign sovereign’s]
official act.” 179 In making this argument in Dugong I, the government asserted
that the case should be dismissed on prudential grounds, as it would interfere
with the conduct of foreign policy by the Executive and Congress. 180

171. Id.
172. Hatmaker v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 973 F. Supp. 1058, 1069–70 (1997).
173. Id. (quoting 36 C.F.R. § 60.3(j)).
174. See Dugong I, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3123, at *62–68.
175. Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 252.
178. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (expanding the act
of state doctrine to other sovereign acts of nations that likely violated international law).
179. Dugong I, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3123, at *65 (quoting Credit Suisse v. U.S. Dist. Court
for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 130 F.3d 1342, 1346 (9th. Cir. 1997)).
180. Id.
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The court disagreed: it ruled the government was not entitled to summary
judgment as the act of state doctrine “relies on the conclusion that the
challenged activities are exclusively those of foreign governmental bodies” and
the record before the court did not currently describe an official act within the
meaning of the act of state doctrine. 181 The actual scope of the act of state
doctrine as applied by the court would have to be left for the subsequent ruling
in Dugong II.
C. Dugong v. Gates (Dugong II)
Three years later, in Dugong II, the court denied the government’s motion
for summary judgment again, ruling that the DoD failed to comply with the
requirements under the NHPA’s extraterritorial provision. The case is in
abeyance until further information is provided to determine the effects of the
Henoko move on the dugong. The federal district court’s rulings have not been
appealed and there does not appear to be a clear roadmap for the Marines to
leave Futenma. 182 In doing so, the court reaffirmed the Japanese Cultural
Registry as the equivalent to the U.S. National Register within the meaning of
the 1980 NHPA amendment, thereby requiring the DoD to account for the
impact of the federal undertaking, the movement of the base from Futenma to
Henoko, on the dugong.
The most significant aspect of the court’s decision was its ruling dismissing
broader foreign policy concerns. The court specifically dismissed the
government’s contention that a federal court should not question the validity of a
sovereign act taken by Japan pursuant to the act of state doctrine. 183 It
acknowledged Japan is ultimately responsible for selecting Futenma as the new
location of the air base and stated, “Japan’s site selection was driven by its own
concerns for environmental, engineering, political, and cost factors.” 184
In limiting the ruling to what it could rule upon, the court ignored larger
prudential concerns that resonate from a narrow ruling focusing on an agency
action. The court stated that it was not invalidating Japan’s decision to relocate
the Marines; it was only requiring the DoD to comply with Section 402 of the
NHPA and take into account its actions on the dugong pursuant to the APA and
Section 402 of the NHPA. 185
The court dismissed the government’s contention that a federal court
should not apply the NHPA overseas in a way that creates a “substantial

181. Id. at *67.
182. See Eric Talmadge, Futenma Shift Puts U.S. in Limbo Between Okinawa, Tokyo, JAPAN
TIMES (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/02/25/national/futenma-shift-puts-us-in-limbo-between-okinawa-tokyo/#.UxtN8-ewLgI.
183. Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1097 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
184. Id. at 1098. The court did limit its ruling to the federal agency action subject to the NHPA
and APA. Id. at 1099.
185. Id. at 1112.
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likelihood that treaty relations will be affected.” 186 The government argued that
requiring the DoD to take into account its action on the dugong would be
inconsistent with Japan’s judgment on how to protect its own cultural resources,
undermining
the
“carefully
negotiated
allocation
of
sovereign
responsibilities.” 187 Yet Japanese law did not protect the dugong, so it would be
inconsistent with Japanese law to apply U.S. law to potentially protect the
dugong.
The court did not truly address this important foreign relations argument in
a straightforward manner. It noted that while these are “important and valid
concerns” they only serve to “delineate and give contour to meaning and scope
of the substantive requirement to take into account.” 188 So, while
acknowledging its importance, the court ultimately gave little deference to the
act of state doctrine. 189
This opinion effectively stopped the planned move of the Marines from
Futenma to Henoko in its tracks. The political fallout was intense and its effects
are felt at Futenma to this day. 190 While the court specifically asserted that it
was not invalidating a sovereign act, the decision-making process was a
complex one, and one where the government of Japan would select and fund the
ultimate site. 191 While it is difficult to measure the precise political impact on
the court’s undoing of the Japanese decision, it is clear the political fallout from
the failure to find a new location for the Marines was powerful, affecting both
United States-Japanese relations and Japanese domestic politics. 192 Further,
litigation continues in the case today and the Marines are still at Futenma. The
matter of the dugong and the Marines is far from resolved.
The Dugong plaintiffs may assert that the DoD should have followed the
Section 402 process from the very beginning, carefully taking into account any
future action on the dugong. But the statutes that do clearly protect the dugong
domestically—the MMPA and the ESA—do not clearly apply within another

186. Id. at 1099. The court recognized that these are “valid and important concerns” but they
only serve to “give contour to the meaning and scope of substantive obligations.” Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1100.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., Greg Jaffe & Emily Heil, U.S. Agrees to Move 9,000 Marines Off Okinawa, THE
WASH. POST (Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-comes-toagreement-with-japan-to-move-9000-marines-off-okinawa/2012/04/26/gIQA1seKkT_story.html
(reporting that the United States and Japan had potentially reached an agreement to move Marines
off of Okinawan bases “in a bid to remove a persistent irritant in the relationship between the two
allies”).
191. Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 1085.
192. Miyume Tanji, U.S. Court Rules in Okinawa Dugong Case: Implications for U.S. Military
Bases Overseas, CRITICAL ASIAN STUDIES, 475, 483 (2008), available at
http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/species/mammals/Okinawa_dugong/pdfs/Dugong_CAS.pdf; cf.
Chico Harlin, U.S. Hopes to Sidestep Futenma Impasse in Moving Okinawa Marines to Guam, THE
WASH. POST, (Feb. 8, 2012) (noting that a series of Japanese prime ministers have been unsuccessful
in gathering support to move the Marines from Okinawa to Henoko).
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sovereign nation’s territory. Further, in light of the importance of this move, the
DoD was careful to comply with all applicable Overseas Environmental
Baseline Guidance Document (OEBGD) standards and overseas environmental
standards. As a federal agency, the DoD complies with the NHPA’s substantive
provisions. But the court’s opinion caught the DoD off guard as the NHPA has
never been construed to apply to protect a wild animal, domestically, or
extraterritorially. As the NHPA has never been construed to apply in such a
manner in its forty years of existence and in the twenty-five years since the
WHC amendments, it was not unreasonable for the DoD not to spend resources
in complying with an unforeseen requirement. 193 As the court failed to breathe
life into the longstanding act of state doctrine in Dugong litigation, the state of
the law and the NHPA’s scope and jurisdiction is increasingly unclear and
unfastened from its original roots in the broader American historic preservation
tradition.
The application of the amended NHPA led to an extraterritorial application
of the NHPA, as perhaps contemplated by the statute, but with results for the
state action of Japan. This is unlike any use of the NHPA to date, and the court’s
interpretation in Dugong calls the amendments to the NHPA to the forefront as
an anomaly in the application of U.S. law extraterritorially.
III.
THE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF OTHER U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
STATUTES
A presumption exists against the extraterritorial application of U.S.
statutes. 194 This presumption serves an important purpose, “protect[ing] against
unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could
result in international discord.” 195 Courts have consistently held that most major
U.S. environmental statutes, including the NEPA, the Clean Water Act, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), and the Clean Air Act (CAA), do not apply extraterritorially within

193. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIR. 6050.16, DOD POLICY FOR ESTABLISHING AND IMPLEMENTING
ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS AT OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS (Sept. 20, 1991). Further, the U.N.’s
comprehensive Dugong Status Report published by the United Nations did not list the NHPA as a
possible vehicle to protect the dugong. It did, however, mention the ESA and the MMPA, which do
not apply in a sovereign nation. U.N. Envtl. Programme [UNEP], Div. of Early Warning &
Assessment [DEWA], Dugong Status Report and Action Plans for Countries and Territories, U.N.
Doc. UNEP/DEWA/RS.02-1 (2002) (compiled by Helene Marsh) [hereinafter Dugong Status
Report].
194. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); see also Foley Bros. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (reiterating the long-standing principle of American law that
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States).
195. EEOC v. Arabian, 499 U.S. at 248; see also Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S.
437, 454 (2007) (“United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.”).
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the sovereign territory of another nation. 196 This is particularly significant for
U.S. military activities overseas as the DoD is by far the largest federal agency
with a foreign presence overseas.
A. The NHPA and the NEPA Should Be Applied in a Similar Manner,
Consistent with Existing Laws and Regulations.
The NHPA and the NEPA share much in common: both are procedural
environmental statutes that apply specifically to federal agency actions. The
NEPA is the basic national charter for the protection of the natural environment
and the NHPA is its rough equivalent for the protection of historic properties.
The two work hand in hand. Federal NEPA regulations state that the act should
be integrated “with other planning and environmental review procedures
required by law or by agency practice so that all such procedures run
concurrently rather than consecutively.” 197 The NHPA’s governing regulations
mirror the same concept: federal agencies are “encouraged to coordinate
compliance with Section 106 . . . with any steps taken to meet the requirements
of the NEPA.” 198
Contrast, however, the NHPA and the NEPA litigation when applied
extraterritorially. In NEPA Coalition of Japan v. Aspin, an environmental group
asserted that the DoD must comply with NEPA obligations when drafting an
environmental impact statement affecting military installation activities in
Japan. In a tightly worded opinion, the D.C. District Court explicitly ruled that
the NEPA did not apply to military activities abroad, focusing on the act of state
concerns first articulated in Underhill. 199 It focused on the potential impairment
of another nation’s sovereignty 200 and emphasized that “DoD operations in
Japan are governed by complex and long standing treaty arrangements.” 201
Moreover, “[b]y requiring the DoD to prepare [environmental impact
statements], the court would risk intruding upon a long standing treaty
relationship.” 202 The court held that the U.S. installations do not exist in a
“lawless vacuum” but instead operate under the agreements reached between the
two sovereigns. 203 While balancing the interests of U.S. foreign policy and
preparing an EIS, the court in Aspin sided with U.S. foreign policy interests. In
doing so, it relied upon Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg,

196. See, e.g., Arc Ecology v. United States Dep’t of the Air Force, 411 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) had no extraterritorial effect).
197. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2(c) (2013).
198. 36 C.F.R. § 800.8(a)(1) (2013).
199. NEPA Coalition v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466 (D.D.C. 1993).
200. Id. at 467.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 468.
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stating, “NEPA requirements must give way when [the] government [makes]
assertions of harm to national security and foreign policy.” 204
Environmental Defense Fund v. Massey also addressed the extraterritorial
application of the NEPA. 205 While Environmental Defense Fund did require an
EIS outside the United States for a National Science Foundation (NSF) project
in Antarctica, the court did not specifically address the extraterritorial
application. 206 The case is easily distinguishable from the Dugong rulings
because the conduct sought to be regulated occurred primarily, if not
exclusively, in the United States, and the alleged extraterritorial effect of the
statute occurred in Antarctica, a continent without a true sovereign. 207
Yet, unlike the NEPA, the NHPA does have an express extraterritorial
provision, although its precise scope and jurisdiction are unclear in the absence
of affirmative Congressional intent. Further, prudential foreign relations
concerns exist in regards to all statutes when determining how they function
overseas. Despite such similarities, the court in the Dugong rulings treated the
NHPA without the same level of deference to the United States’ broader foreign
policy concerns.
B. The MMPA and the ESA Protect the Dugong Domestically.
The Dugong rulings did not discuss U.S. domestic statutes that do
expressly apply to wild animals. Indeed, the NHPA has not been the statutory
mechanism to protect the dugong within the United States, 208 or does the WHC
provide for an express protection of a living animal. Instead, the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) most clearly governs this
area of domestic law as applied via treaty obligations. 209
1.

The MMPA

The MMPA clearly prohibits the unlawful taking of the dugong within the
United States; it expressly protects the dugong as well as seven other marine
mammals. 210 Under the statute, it is unlawful “for any person, vessel, or

204. Id. (quoting Comm. for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 796, 798
(D.C.Cir.1971)). The court concludes by stating, “We determine that the presumption against
extraterritoriality not only is applicable, but particularly applies in this case because there are clear
foreign policy and treaty concerns involving a security relationship between the United States and a
sovereign power.” Id. at 468.
205. Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 528–29 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. “The dugong would not—and could not—be protected under U.S. historic preservation
law.” Motion to Dismiss at 12, Dugong I, No. C 03-4350 MHP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3123 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 2, 2005).
209. See, e.g., WEISS ET AL., supra note 101, at 819.
210. 50 C.F.R. § 18.3 (2009). Also listed are the polar bear, sea otter, walrus, West Indian
manatee, Amazonian manatee, West African manatee, and Marine otter. As defined within the
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conveyance subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to take any marine
mammal on the high seas.” 211 It is also unlawful “to take any marine mammal
in waters or on lands under the jurisdiction of the United States.” 212 Thus, the
MMPA’s jurisdiction extends to the “high seas” and to “waters under the
jurisdiction of the United States.” 213 While the statute does not provide for an
explicit definition of high seas, it has not been construed to apply in another
nation’s sovereign territory. 214 Consequently, the term “waters under the
jurisdiction of the United States” is defined as: “(A) the territorial sea of the
United States; (B) the waters included within a zone, contiguous to the territorial
sea of the United States, of which the inner boundary is a line coterminous with
the seaward boundary of each coastal State, and the other boundary is a line
drawn in such a manner that each point on it is 200 nautical miles from the
baseline from which the territorial sea is measured.” 215
2.

The ESA

The ESA, too, clearly prohibits the unlawful taking of the dugong as
applied domestically. The dugong is currently on the endangered species list
administered by the Fish and Wildlife Administration (FWS). 216 The ESA was
signed in 1973 with the finding that “various species of fish, wildlife, and plants
in the United States have been rendered extinct as a result of economic growth
and development not tempered by adequate concern and conservation.” 217 The
ESA’s purpose is to conserve endangered species and threatened species and the
ecosystems upon which they depend. 218 The international obligations under the

MMPA, “take” means to harass, hunt, capture, collect, or kill, or attempt to harass, hunt, capture,
collect, or kill any marine mammal, including, without limitation, any of the following: The
collection of dead animals or parts thereof; the restraint or detention of a marine mammal, no matter
how temporary; tagging a marine mammal; or the negligent or intentional operation of an aircraft or
vessel, or the doing of any other negligent or intentional act which results in the disturbing or
molesting of a marine mammal. Id.
211. 50 C.F.R. § 18.11(a).
212. 50 C.F.R. § 18.11(b).
213. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(1). “It is unlawful for (1) for any person subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States or any vessel or other conveyance subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to
take any marine mammal on the high seas.” Id.
214. For a discussion of why “high seas” needs to be further defined by Congress in both the
ESA and the MMPA, see generally Keith Gibel, Defined by the Law of the Sea, “High Seas” in the
Marine Mammal Protection Act and the Endangered Species Act, 54 NAV. L. REV. 1 (2007).
215. 16 U.S.C. § 1362 (15)(A)–(B). There is also a provision that defines jurisdiction of the
United States in reference to an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, but it is
not relevant to our discussion here. See § 1362 (15)(C).
216.
The scientific name is the dugong dugon and the common name is dugong. The U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service regularly updates the list of threatened and endangered species and description
on the dugong can be found at http://ecos.fws.gov/speciesProfile/profile/speciesProfile.action?spcod
e=A033 (last visited Mar. 18, 2014).
217. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(1) (2012).
218. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
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CITES treaty are implemented via the ESA. 219 The ESA specifically protects
listed “species,” defined as “any subspecies of fish or wildlife or plants, and any
distinct population segment of any species of vertebrate fish or wildlife which
interbreeds when mature” 220 as well as “designated critical habitats.” 221 Each
federal agency, including the DoD, must ensure that agency action “does not
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened
species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such
species which is determined by the Secretary.” 222
Under Section 9 of the ESA, it is unlawful for any person subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States to “take any such species within the United
States or the territorial sea of the United States” or to “take any such species on
the high seas.” 223 Both “high seas” and “territorial sea” remain undefined within
the ESA statutory construct. 224 However, Congress made clear in its legislative
history when discussing the ESA’s jurisdictional reach that it did not intend for
the Section 9 “take” prohibitions to apply within another sovereign’s
territory. 225 It reiterated the same concern when amending the ESA in 1982,
stating that “critical habitat provisions of the act only apply to areas within the
jurisdiction of the United States and that the designation of critical habitat in
foreign countries or on the high seas would be inappropriate.” 226
While the ESA has been interpreted to apply on the high seas 227 and the
MMPA 228 has been interpreted to apply outside U.S. territory, neither statute
219. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4)(F). CITES prohibits the international trade of certain threatened
species listed within an appendix to the treaty. Convention on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 27 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force
July 1, 1975).
220. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(16).
221. 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.94–17.96 (2012).
222. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2012).
223. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(B)–(C) (2012). “Take” means to “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.” 16 U.S.C. §
1532(19).
224. Nash, supra note 14, at 997-1005.
225. Gibel, supra note 214, at 24 (quoting the legislative House report that the ESA “did not
make illegal such actions if performed entirely with [sic] one or more foreign countries”); H.R. Rep.
No. 93-740 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3001.
226. H.R. Rep. No. 97-567 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807; see also Gibel, supra
note 214, at 25.
227. See Lujan v. Defenders of the Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 582 (1992). While the majority
opinion did not specifically rule on the extraterritorial reach of the ESA, Justice Stevens agreed with
the Government, relying upon the Foley doctrine that the ESA “does not apply to activities in
foreign countries.” Id. at 585 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911
F.2d 117, 123 (8th Cir. 1990). While the ESA discusses the “high seas” and likely applies outside of
the United States, it does not reach into another sovereign nation’s territory. Although one court
found extraterritorial application of the ESA when U.S. foreign actions have significant
environmental impacts within the United States, the case was subsequently overturned for a lack of
standing. See generally Gibel, supra note 214, at 54 (discussing the application of the ESA and the
MMPA on the high seas).
228. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a) (2012) (as amended). The MMPA defines “marine mammal” as any
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has been construed to apply in the sovereign territory of another nation.
Fundamentally, the NHPA applies to “historic preservation” while the ESA and
the MMPA apply specifically to “endangered species” and “marine mammals”
respectively. Further, the foundational question, “What statute could protect the
dugong?” was discussed in 2002 and prior to Dugong I and Dugong II when the
United Nations issued an extensive 172-page report on the dugong’s threatened
status in the world. The report specifically addressed the potential protections
afforded by law, discussing the ESA and the NEPA as plausible statutory
vehicles to protect the dugong, but did not mention the NHPA. 229 In effect, the
NHPA is creatively utilized to protect an animal clearly protected by both the
ESA and the MMPA. 230
The following table synthesizes the various protections afforded to the
dugong in the United States and Japan based upon the four statutes introduced
above. The surprising outcome is delineated below.
Table 3

Statute

Applies to Dugong in
United States?

Applies to Dugong in
Another Sovereign
Nation?

NEPA

Yes

No 231

ESA

Yes 232

No 233

MMPA
NHPA

Yes 234
No 236

No 235
Yes? 237

mammal that “is morphologically adapted to the marine environment,” such as manatees, whales and
dugongs. Id. § 1362(6); see also Donald C. Baur, W. Robert Irvin & Darren R. Misenko,
Symposium: Changing Tides in Ocean Management: Putting ‘Protection’ into Marine Protected
Areas, 28 VT. L. REV. 497, 549 (2004).
229. Dugong Status Report, supra note 193, at 45.
230. For example, the ESA states, “the purposes of this Act are to provide a means whereby
the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved, to
provide a program for the conservation of such endangered species and threatened species, and to
take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties and conventions.” 16
U.S.C. § 1351(b). The MMPA states that “marine mammals have proven themselves to be resources
of great international significance, esthetic and recreational as well as economic, and it is the sense
of the Congress that they should be protected and encouraged to develop to the greatest extent
feasible commensurate with sound policies of resource management and that the primary objective
of their management should be to maintain the health and stability of the marine ecosystem.” 16
U.S.C. § 1361(6).
231. NEPA Coalition v. Aspin, 837 F. Supp. 466, 466–68 (D.D.C. 1993).
232. See Endangered Species, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,
http://www.fws.gov/endangered/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2013).
233. Lujan v. Defenders of the Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 585 (1992).
234. “The term ‘marine mammal’ means any mammal morphologically adapted to the marine
environment . . . [to include the dugong].” 16 U.S.C. § 1362(6); 50 C.F.R. § 18.3.
235. 16 U.S.C. § 1372(a)(1); United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
236. The dugong is not listed on the U.S. National Register of Historic Places. Outside the
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C. Other U.S. Environmental Statutes’ Extraterritorial Application
Other foundational American environmental laws, including the Clean
Water Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), and the Safe
Drinking Water Act, have not been held to apply in another sovereign, 238 but
the NHPA is the only environmental law statute that has been held to apply
within the territory of another sovereign nation. 239
The extraterritorial application of two additional environmental statutes, the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) and the Clean Air Act (CAA) have unique provisions affecting their
jurisdictional reach and are discussed in greater detail below. CERCLA
empowers foreign claimants to assert claims against monies in the CERCLA
Superfund, but only if recovery is authorized by a “treaty or executive
agreement between the United States and the foreign country involved, or if the
Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and other
appropriate officials, certifies that such country provides a comparable remedy
for United States claimants.” 240 However, CERLCA claims from foreign
litigants in another nation’s territory have proven unsuccessful. For example, in
Arc Ecology v. United States Department of the Air Force the court expressly
rejected CERCLA’s application in a foreign nation, denying a claim by Filipino
litigants seeking to apply CERCLA’s protections to two former U.S. military
bases in the Philippines. 241 In doing so, the court focused on the presumption
against applying U.S. laws extraterritorially. It examined CERCLA’s purpose,
legislative history, and scope to determine that Congress did not provide “clear
evidence” to apply CERCLA extraterritorially. 242
Lastly, the CAA authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency
Administrator to mitigate air pollution problems in a foreign nation caused by
domestic U.S. emissions only if “the Administrator determines [the country] has
given the United States essentially the same rights with respect to the prevention
or control of air pollution occurring in that country as is given that country by
this section.” 243 Nonetheless, it appears that the United States has been reluctant
Dugong rulings, no court has held the dugong to be a “historic property” within the meaning of the
NHPA.
237. Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1082 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
238. See generally Nash, supra note 14, at 997–1019 (2010) (providing an overview of
American environmental law as applied extraterritorially).
239. See Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (holding that
NEPA was applied to a federal action in Antarctica). The court took pains to highlight the unique
nature of Antarctica and its status as a non-sovereign entity. Id.
240. See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9611(l)(4) (2012).
241. Arc Ecology v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 294 F. Supp. 2d 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2003), aff’d,
411 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2005).
242. Id.
243. See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7415(c) (2012).
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to pursue judicial obligations concerning the extraterritorial application of this
provision, and no case has applied it in such a manner. 244
IV.
THE NHPA’S FUTURE EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION AND THE POTENTIAL
IMPACT ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
This brief analysis of the extraterritorial application of U.S. environmental
laws demonstrates that the presumptions against extraterritoriality and broader
foreign relations concerns have been critical considerations for judicial rulings
limiting U.S. legal reach in a sovereign territory. Yet, the NHPA has an express
extraterritorial provision that must be deciphered, albeit without any clear
direction from Congress. Congressional legislation applies only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States—this is commonly referred to as the
“Foley doctrine.” 245 The Foley doctrine states that the judiciary is ill-equipped
to resolve such complex political and foreign policy matters and that the court
should not find an extraterritorial application in the absence of a clearly
expressed congressional purpose. 246 While the NHPA clearly applies abroad via
the 1980 WHC implementing amendments, minimal case law outside the
Dugong litigation exists regarding proper construction of statutes that have clear
extraterritorial provisions.
The judiciary’s historical reluctance to weigh in on matters implicating
broader foreign relations concerns is further magnified by the weighty national
security risks at issue in the Dugong litigation, considering that the DoD
conducts the bulk of U.S. federal agency actions overseas. Absent clear evidence
of Congressional intent behind the scope of the 1980 WHC implementing
amendments to the NHPA, courts should exercise discretion consistent with the
Foley doctrine and Kiobel, discussed below, and not hunt or infer congressional
purpose and intent in how the NHPA applies overseas where none clearly exists.
A. The NHPA: A Singular Environmental Statute in Jurisdiction and
Scope
The court’s interpretation of the NHPA provisions highlights the unsettled
scope and jurisdiction of the 1980 WHC amendments to the NHPA. The
uncertainty has potentially significant consequences for the planning of U.S.
activities overseas. Indeed, the holding in the Dugong litigation creates further
unpredictability regarding the practical scope and jurisdiction of the NHPA and
illustrates the curious magnifying power of the NHPA when applied overseas.

244.
245.
246.

See Nash, supra note 14.
Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285–86 (1949).
Id.

2014]
1.

THE NATIONAL HISTORIC PRESERVATION ACT

425

Jurisdiction: The NHPA Is a Singular U.S. Statute with Worldwide
Jurisdiction That Can Protect the Environment

Today, the NHPA stands out as the singular U.S. statute that affords
worldwide environmental protections in another sovereign. 247 While Executive
Orders state that the U.S. military must abide by environmental obligations
overseas, they do not independently allow for judicially enforceable causes of
action in a U.S. court. The NHPA is truly a unique environmental statute in this
regard. From a jurisdictional perspective, Dugong II interprets the 1980
amendments to the NHPA to include the allowance for a cause of action in
another nation’s sovereign territory.
2.

Scope: The NHPA’s Practical Application Now Remains Uncertain
with Broader National Security Implications

Beyond the uncertain jurisdiction of the NHPA is the unpredictability
regarding the substantive interpretations of the statute. This unpredictability
could encompass an element of another nation’s equivalent National Register to
include wild animals under the NHPA’s protections. The Dugong rulings’ broad
interpretation of the NHPA’s “equivalent of the National Register” effectively
widens the United States’ obligations prior to a federal agency undertaking a
project abroad.
The Dugong rulings expanded the extraterritorial application of the
National Register beyond both the NHPA’s traditional protection of strictly
physical, tangible, historic properties and the underlying purpose of the NHPA.
The holding also went beyond the WHC’s protection of natural and cultural
properties. And the court interpreted the NHPA language as providing
protections of “properties” that neither the NHPA nor the WHC could
independently provide. 248
Practically, the World Heritage List and U.S. National Register have not
been utilized to afford protections to living organisms. Indeed, culturally
significant American animals that would appear to be logical candidates for
inclusion on the National Register are absent. For example, neither the iconic
American bald eagle nor Colorado bison is included on the National Register.
Also absent are living objects, including the California Redwoods and the
247. As discussed earlier, this Article uses the general term “environmental statute” to include
the broad array of environmental legislation (e.g., the Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act and
natural resources statutes (e.g., Sikes Act)). While Blue Water Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine
Fisheries Servs., 158 F. Supp. 2d 118 (D. Mass 2001) did uphold the extraterritorial reach of the
Magnuson-Stevens Act in federal waters beyond the United States 200 nautical mile Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ), it did not specifically hold that the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation
and Management Act applied in another nation’s sovereign territory.
248. The court noted that the United States could, in theory, protect living objects pursuant to
the NHPA, quoting a case, Hatmaker v. Georgia Dep’t of Transp., which suggested a living tree that
had cultural meaning to Native Americans could be listed on the National Register. Dugong v.
Rumsfeld (“Dugong I”), No. C 03-4350 MHP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3123, at *33 (N.D. Cal. Mar.
2, 2005) (emphasis added).
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General Sherman tree at Sequoia National Park. In total, the eighty-year old U.S.
National Register contains over 88,000 properties. None are wild organisms or
living objects. 249
The WHC clearly protects natural features, such as geological and physical
formations and natural sites or areas of outstanding universal value 250 under its
“natural heritage” provision. The statute does not clearly provide for the
protection of wild animals. The WHC contains a definition of “monument” that
could protect the habitats of living animals, but it is less expansive than Japan’s
definition under the Law of Cultural Property. Overall, there are 981 properties
on the World Heritage List; the dugong is not among them and none are wild
animals. 251
In sum, neither the NHPA nor the WHC has clear provisions that protect
wild animals. Nor do they provide protections for the broad expanse of
properties envisioned by individual nations’ cultural and historic domestic laws.
Moreover, the courts have not broadened the interpretation and application of
the statutes. 252 Yet, somehow, the sum is greater than the individual parts. The
combination of the WHC implementing provision via the NHPA adds up to a
result—as construed by the Dugong rulings—more expansive than what each
treaty or statute individually calls for.
B. The NHPA Derives from Preservation Statutes Addressing Physical
Properties and Has Gradually Evolved from Earlier American Historic
Preservation Efforts
As discussed in Part I, the NHPA and its 1980 amendments cannot be
examined in a vacuum; their plain language is clearly derivative of earlier
preservation efforts rooted in Gettysburg, the Antiquities Act, the Historic Sites
Act, and the National Trust for Historic Preservation Act. Indeed, the NHPA’s
modern National Register originated from the 1935 Historic Sites Act. 253
Hence, the NHPA is properly viewed as the natural, gradual outgrowth that
developed organically within larger historic preservation goals. While the scope
of protected properties under U.S. historical preservation law has systematically
expanded from singular sites, buildings, objects, and structures to encapsulate
historic districts and historical landscapes, it is still rooted in specific, physical
categories without including that which may be of historical or cultural value. 254

249. Nat’l Register of Historic Places, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/nr/ (last
visited Mar. 8, 2014).
250. WHC, supra note 21, at art. 2.
251. World Heritage List, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/list (last visited Mar. 8, 2014)
(listing the 981 properties currently protected under the World Heritage List).
252. Dugong I, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3123, at *26.
253. The Historic Sites Act registry became the National Historic Landmark program. This was
integrated into the NHPA’s National Registry in 1966.
254. See Sherry Hutt, Caroline Meredith Blanco, Walter E. Stern & Stan N. Harris, CULTURAL
PROPERTY LAW: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE TO THE MANAGEMENT, PROTECTION, AND
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And none of the historic preservation statutes clearly provide for the protections
of living animals. Moreover, the definition of historic property was not
specifically expanded in 1980 to address additional properties. Accordingly, the
NHPA is best seen nested within Professor Rose’s “third phase of [American]
historic preservation” 255 with the earlier phases having clear, traceable roots in
efforts by the Mount Vernon Ladies Association and the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Gettysburg.
Indeed, it is impossible to decouple the NHPA’s provisions addressing the
protection of historic properties from the earlier historic preservation efforts and
laws. The evolutionary sequencing is unmistakable: the Antiquities Act—the
first comprehensive federal historic preservation act—preserved landmarks,
structures, and objects. 256 The Historic Sites Act preserved sites, buildings, and
objects with a provision for physical structures. 257 The National Register was
established under the Historic Sites Act and later fully integrated into the
NHPA. 258 The NHPA built upon these prior statutes by merely adding districts
to the maturing definition of historic properties. The WHC’s implementing
language was added in 1980, fourteen years after the NHPA’s passage without
further defining “foreign historic properties” or “foreign undertakings” in
regulation or law.
When the NHPA was drafted in 1966, and during its subsequent
amendments, there was no discussion or apparent thought to its impact on
foreign relations. If additional courts were to follow the approach seen in
Dugong I and II, we would now be entering a new “fourth phase” of historic
preservation, in Professor Rose’s lexicon, whereby the NHPA has worldwide
applicability to include the protection of wild animals and all the historic
preservation laws of every state party to the WHC. If so, this phase would be
brought forward by the judicial branch, unlike the other phases, which were
legislated and initiated through both citizen activism and the legislative process.
As the U.S. military is involved with innumerable, broadly defined federal
“undertakings” every year, what are the practical foreign relations and national
security consequences of such an expansive view? The answer is explored in
detail below.
C. The NHPA Should Be Applied in a Manner that Fully Takes into
Account Prudential Foreign Relations Concerns
While the ATS lacks an express extraterritorial provision, it shares
commonalities with the NHPA and other environmental statutes as a plausible
statutory vehicle to litigate environmental claims in sovereign nations. While it
remains unclear whether the NHPA will be used extensively to litigate
PRESERVATION OF HERITAGE RESOURCES 2 (2004).
255. Rose, supra note 23, at 489.
256. 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–33.
257. 16 U.S.C. §§ 461–67.
258. 16 U.S.C. § 464(b).
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environmental claims overseas, the Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co. reinforces important foreign policy concerns that should
apply to a case brought under the NHPA.
1.

The Alien Tort Statute, Kiobel, and “Weighty Concerns”

The ATS has received much attention as a possible vehicle to address
environmental claims overseas. 259 The Supreme Court recently held that the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS. Once
again, it focused on important foreign policy concerns similar to those raised in
resolving environmental litigation discussed in Part III. The statute, passed in
1789 as part of the Judiciary Act, provides that “[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 260
Its utility as a potential vehicle to resolve environmental claims was
renewed following Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. 261 Filartiga opened U.S. courts to
address human rights abuses, and it seemed plausible that the ATS could
similarly be used to resolve environmental harms abroad. 262 While the ATS had
been invoked only twice in the 18th century and sparingly before Filartiga, its
potential ability to address overseas environmental claims has increased in the
past twenty-five years. 263 Several environmental cases have been recently
brought under the ATS, seeking redress for claims originating in other
nations. 264 However, despite a flurry of lawsuits, these claims have been largely
unsuccessful, 265 and the Supreme Court narrowed the statute’s application in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain in 2004. 266
In Kiobel, Nigerian nationals filed suit in federal court alleging that nonU.S. corporations committed violations of the law of nations in Nigeria. 267
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority in Kiobel, rejected the assertion
that the ATS applies extraterritorially, emphasizing the “weighty concerns” and
“serious foreign policy consequences” underlying the presumption against
extraterritoriality. 268 The Court reinforced this longstanding presumption,
guarding against serious foreign policy consequences and highlighting the

259. See, e.g., Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
260. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
261. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
262. For a general guide to environmental claims and the Alien Tort Statute, see Kathleen
Jawger, Environmental Claims Under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 519 (2010).
263. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). See also Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
264. See, e.g., Beanal, 197 F.3d at 161.
265. Id.
266. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714 (2004).
267. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1662.
268. Id. at 1668–69.
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importance of judicial caution in such arenas. 269 Applying U.S. law “does not
typically impose the sovereign will of the United States onto conduct occurring
within the territorial jurisdiction of another sovereign.” 270
Kiobel relied heavily upon EEOC v. Arabian Oil Co., a case holding that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act does not apply extraterritorially to regulate the
employment practices of United States firms that employ American citizens
abroad. 271 The Court explained in Kiobel, “For us to run interference in . . . a
delicate field of international relations there must be present the affirmative
intention of Congress clearly expressed.” 272
However, unlike the ATS, the NHPA does have a clear provision that
applies extraterritorially. 273 Litigants may assert that the existence of an
extraterritorial provision within the NHPA should obviate the need to address
the weighty foreign policy concerns enunciated in Kiobel and similar cases
limiting the reach of U.S. statutes abroad. Yet, the same prudential foreign
policy concerns exist in determining how to properly interpret and apply the
NHPA in another sovereign nation. Moreover, the NHPA lacks clear
congressional “affirmative intention” 274 in how to interpret the extraterritorial
provision abroad. An expansive view of its application in another sovereign
without further Congressional instruction would ignore such concerns.
2.

Comity and Act of State

Kiobel’s concurring opinion, written by Justice Breyer, re-emphasized the
importance of judicial comity when determining a U.S. statute’s impact on
foreign relations. Comity is a principle of legal reciprocity that ensures
courtesies and respect among political entities, such as nations, states, or courts
of different jurisdictions. 275 Justice Breyer was wary of adjudicating a case
originating in Nigeria in light of the executive branch’s view of the case’s
potential impact on foreign policy. 276 He stated, “Adjudicating any such claim

269. Id. at 1664–66 (asserting that “the danger of unwarranted judicial interference in the
conduct of foreign policy is magnified in the context of the ATS, because the question is not what
Congress has done but instead what courts may do”).
270. Id. at 1667.
271. EEOC v. Arabian Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511
U.S. 244, 251 (1994).
272. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (quoting Arabian Oil, 499 U.S. at 248).
273. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2.
274. See Arabian Oil, 499 U.S. at 248.
275. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 261 (7th ed. 1999). Further, the Second Circuit in Kiobel
stated, “Unilaterally recognizing new norms of customary international law—that is, norms that have
not been universally accepted by the rest of the civilized world—would potentially create friction in
our relations with foreign nations and, therefore, would contravene the international comity the
statute was enacted to promote.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Pet. Co., 621 F.3d 111, 140–41 (2d Cir.
2010).
276. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1670–78 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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must, in my view, also be consistent with those notions of comity that lead each
nation to respect the sovereign rights of other nations by limiting the reach of its
own laws and its enforcement.” 277 Breyer desired to minimize international
friction in the Court’s ruling, specifically restating his opinion in a prior ATS
decision, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 278 to find jurisdiction outside the United
States only when “distinct American interests are at issue” with consideration to
the “limiting principles such as exhaustion, forum non conveniens, and
comity.” 279
Clearly, the NHPA’s extraterritorial provision applies within another
sovereign. 280 Nevertheless, the important foreign relations concerns should not
be dismissed by a U.S. court in considering the statute’s applicability and scope,
particularly when another nation lacks a reciprocal judicial remedy.
Accordingly, in light of the weighty foreign policy concerns addressed in
Kiobel, future judicial applications of the NHPA’s extraterritorial provision
should be limited and nuanced in scope, and courts should exercise appropriate
caution when taking into account any decision of another sovereign. 281
The “act of state” doctrine prevents U.S. courts from questioning the
validity of a foreign country’s acts within its borders, reflecting a strong
sentiment that the judicial judgment on the validity of foreign acts may hinder
the conduct of foreign affairs. 282 Diplomacy often involves complex,
multifaceted negotiations between two sovereigns. This is particularly true with
military operations and undertakings overseas in light of the political importance
of such moves; seldom is such a decision made unilaterally by a nation. Moving
the Marines from Futenma involved intense and lengthy negotiations between
the United States and Japan. Japan made the ultimate decision, which was
informed by U.S. “operational parameters.” 283 The consequences of Dugong II
suggest that an act of another sovereign can be effectively invalidated if the
United States is intimately involved in the decision-making process. Kiobel
reinforces the importance of judicial restraint when such decisions impact
foreign relations. 284
277. Id. at 1671 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
278. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 (2004).
279. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1674 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21).
280. 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2.
281. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1661.
282. Under the modern interpretation of the act of state doctrine, it may be invoked only when
there is an “official act of a foreign sovereign performed within its own territory,” and “the relief
sought or the defense interposed [in the action would require] a court in the United States to declare
invalid the [foreign sovereign’s] official act.” W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc. v. Envtl. Tectonics
Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 405 (1990).
283. Dugong II, 543 F. Supp. 2d 1082, 1085 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
284. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (“The presumption against extraterritorial application helps
ensure that the Judiciary does not erroneously adopt an interpretation of U.S. law that carries foreign
policy consequences not clearly intended by the political branches.”) (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 251 (1994)).
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Forum Non Conveniens, Treaty Obligations, and the Failure of
Japanese Judicial Remedies

In civil procedure, the doctrine of forum non conveniens (Latin for
“inconvenient court”) states that a forum may be divested of jurisdiction if the
action should be instituted in another forum where the action could originally
have been brought. 285 In tort law, American courts are perceived to be more
generous to plaintiffs than the law in most foreign jurisdictions, making U.S.
courts a preferred forum for foreign litigants in cases against U.S. companies.
The common law doctrine of forum non conveniens ensures that the court is
properly balancing convenience against the choice of forum. The court must first
determine whether an alternative forum exists. 286 In the Dugong decisions,
forum non conveniens was not clearly implicated as Japan lacked a clear judicial
forum to hear the litigants’ claims. Paradoxically, because Japanese law did not
provide a legal remedy, the doctrine of forum non conveniens could not be
invoked. Nevertheless, future judicial inquiries into the extraterritorial
application of the NHPA should carefully examine other, competing forums for
redress to ensure the U.S. court is the proper forum to hear such a claim.
The 1980 NHPA amendments as expressed in the Dugong decisions may
have broader national security implications than the NHPA’s intended
purpose. 287 As discussed earlier, Japan’s domestic environmental laws are

285.
286.
287.
that—

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 665 (7th ed. 1999).
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 255 n.22 (1981).
The statute itself specifies the NHPA’s purpose as follows: Congress finds and declares
1. the spirit and direction of the Nation are founded upon and reflected in its historic
heritage;
2. the historical and cultural foundations of the Nation should be preserved as a living
part of our community life and development in order to give a sense of orientation
to the American people;
3. historic properties significant to the Nation’s heritage are being lost or
substantially altered, often inadvertently, with increasing frequency;
4. the preservation of this irreplaceable heritage is in the public interest so that its
vital legacy of cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and energy
benefits will be maintained and enriched for future generations of Americans;
5. in the face of ever-increasing extensions of urban centers, highways, and
residential, commercial, and industrial developments, the present governmental
and nongovernmental historic preservation programs and activities are inadequate
to insure future generations a genuine opportunity to appreciate and enjoy the rich
heritage of our Nation;
6. the increased knowledge of our historic resources, the establishment of better
means of identifying and administering them, and the encouragement of their
preservation will improve the planning and execution of Federal and federally
assisted projects and will assist economic growth and development; and
7. although the major burdens of historic preservation have been borne and major
efforts initiated by private agencies and individuals, and both should continue to
play a vital role, it is nevertheless necessary and appropriate for the Federal
Government to accelerate its historic preservation programs and activities, to give
maximum encouragement to agencies and individuals undertaking preservation by
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inadequate to protect the dugong since Japanese administrative rules do not
allow for a citizen suit that would protect the dugong. Thus, the Japanese
litigants were forced to join the U.S. environmental groups pursuant to U.S.
law. 288 Further, Japanese law does not allow for any judicially enforceable
redress from its political leaders’ decision, and the Japanese plaintiffs lacked an
avenue to bring a lawsuit. 289 In the Dugong rulings, is the judiciary
undermining Japan’s law and wishes, and the executive branch’s foreign affairs
power in ruling in this area? 290
Lastly, Japan and the United States signed a bilateral Status of Forces
Agreement (SOFA) in 1960 that governs United States-Japanese military
relations. 291 The SOFA regulates the sending state’s (United States) military’s
actions in the host nation (Japan). 292 But outside the SOFA, the United States
has not signed an additional international agreement outside the WHC or the
SOFA to specifically abide by Japan’s Law on Cultural Property. And this has
not been integrated into the existing SOFA framework.
D. The NHPA’s Practical Foreign Relations and National Security
Consequences for Future Actions Overseas
Today, the NHPA stands alone as the only statute protecting historic
properties, natural or cultural resources, or the human environment that has been
held to apply in another sovereign’s territory. The outer bounds to what the
NHPA can protect overseas and where it can protect it are unclear after the
Dugong rulings. If U.S. courts determine that another nation’s historic or
cultural property laws are the “equivalent of” the U.S. National Register,
anything that the foreign nation deems to be of importance would be governed
by the NHPA’s protections, even within the foreign nation’s sovereign territory.
1.

The U.S. Military’s Pacific Re-Balancing

The U.S. DoD is the single largest employer in the world with 3.3 million
people, operating hundreds of federal facilities within the United States and

private means, and to assist State and local governments and the National Trust for
Historic Preservation in the United States to expand and accelerate their historic
preservation programs and activities.
16 U.S.C. § 470(b) (2012).
288. Takahashi, supra note 6, at 197.
289. Id. at 190.
290. The present-day fallout from the failure to find a replacement location has incensed many
local Okinawans. Okinawans have grown increasingly concerned about the future of the Marine base
in their home city, with some Okinawans threatening secession due, in part, to the intransigence
surrounding this issue. Martin Fackler, In Okinawa, Talk of Break from Japan Turns Serious, N.Y.
TIMES, July 6, 2013, at A6.
291. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960, 11 U.S.T. 1633–35, and the Status of
Forces Agreement (“SOFA”), 3 U.S.T. 3342–62 [hereinafter U.S.-Japan SOFA].
292. Id.
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across the world with U.S. military personnel in 150 countries. 293 Military base
openings and closures are fluid in nature, giving rise to numerous federal
undertakings within the meaning of the NHPA, which are also reviewable
agency actions within the meaning of the APA and therefore challengeable in
federal court. Applying the court’s logic in the Dugong II ruling, a thorough
understanding of each nation’s equivalent of the National Register and
accompanying historic and cultural preservation laws is essential before any
federal undertaking occurs overseas.
The U.S. National Register focuses on the protection of five types of
“historic properties.” Yet, other nations’ cultural and historic preservation laws
often include protections well beyond what was envisioned in the U.S. National
Register, including archeological sites, landscapes, animals, plants, people,
documents, and social institutions. Rather than applying the NHPA strictly in
accordance with the U.S. law, the NHPA may now protect “properties” as they
are independently defined by each nation’s historic preservation statute.
This is significant. Many nations’ National Registers go well beyond the
five categories of property that are included in the U.S. National Register.294
Once it can be determined that an individual foreign nation’s Register is
equivalent to the U.S. National Register, the legal key can now effectively
“unlock the door” to the full menu of protections afforded by the foreign
nation’s domestic statute. Once this door is opened, the NHPA can protect
properties that it has not traditionally protected domestically.
This is particularly important as the United States military shifts forces to
the Pacific theater in light of continuing national security threats from North
Korea and a broader movement of forces from Afghanistan and the Middle East
to Australia, among others. 295 Such shifts will inevitably trigger requirements as
innumerable federal undertakings within the meaning of the NHPA will be sure
to follow. 296 As the Dugong rulings are the only examples addressing the
contours of what constitutes foreign undertaking under the NHPA, considerable
uncertainty remains. 297

293. For a list of U.S. personnel serving overseas, see U.S. Military Personnel by Country,
CNN.COM, http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/04/us/table.military.troops (last visited Mar. 8,
2014).
294. See, e.g., Monteith, supra note 97, at 1034–39 (discussing the requisite laws and national
registers in Egypt and France while noting that Canada, Denmark, and Australia have more
expansive national registers).
295. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bulmiller, U.S. Pivots Eastward to Address Uneasy Allies, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 2011, at A4.
296. Undertaking means “a project, activity, or program funded in whole or in part under the
direct or indirect jurisdiction of a Federal agency, including those carried out by or on behalf of a
Federal agency; those carried out with Federal financial assistance; and those requiring a Federal
permit, license or approval.” 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(y) (2013). As discussed in Part I, the NHPA lacks
specific guidance for a foreign undertaking. Supra, Part I.
297. See, e.g., Dugong I, No. C 03-4350 MHP, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3123, at *41 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 2, 2005). This raises several additional questions: How should the definition of undertaking be
applied in another country? What is the “equivalent of the National Register” within these 150
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At the time of this writing, the U.S. military is operating around the world
with plans to withdraw from Afghanistan, establish a more permanent presence
in Australia, and maintain a strong presence in South Korea. 298 With a focus on
the Pacific theater, the DoD will undertake many federal actions that could be
litigated in the Ninth Circuit or California’s federal district courts (perhaps even
the same court that ruled on the Dugong litigation). Some of these nations have
expansive National Registers that go well beyond the NHPA’s protections. 299
The discussion below provides a snapshot of three nations’ historic and cultural
preservation laws, demonstrating the spectrum of properties that could be
protected by the NHPA.
2.

Practical Examples: South Korea, Australia, and Afghanistan

The U.S. military has had a strong presence in South Korea since the
conclusion of the Korean War. Today, over 30,000 U.S. military personnel in
the country work at over forty active military sites. 300 The military threat is real;
North Korea has recently conducted three nuclear tests and routinely threatens
South Korea and the United States with a preemptive attack. 301 The Korean
Cultural Heritage Protection Act is similar to the Japanese Law on Cultural
Property in that it protects a broad category of cultural heritage, including
tangible and intangible works, folklore resources, historic sites, plants, and
animals. 302 While Korean law shares similar goals with the NHPA, properties
and works it protects are considerably larger than what the NHPA affords. For
example, the Korean law protects plants, animals, and intangible cultural works
including dance and music. 303
Consider a fact pattern similar to that in the Dugong litigation, whereby the
Korean government works closely with the U.S. government to transfer or
relocate a U.S. base in Korea due to an emerging national security threat with
North Korea. Perhaps not surprisingly, this involves intense diplomatic
negotiations between the two countries. The United States does not conduct an
NHPA federal undertaking analysis to encompass impacts on all Korean historic

countries? What do these laws protect?
298.
See, e.g., Laris Karklis, U.S. Military Expansion in Southeast Asia, WASH. POST, Mar.
25, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/2012/03/25/gIQASFQXaS_graphic.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).
299. See Ingrid Borstrom, Note, The Cultural Significance of Wildlife: Using the National
Historic Preservation Act to Protect Iconic Species, 12 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
147, 158–59 (2006).
300. DEP’T OF DEF. BASE STRUCTURE REPORT, available at
http://www.acq.osd.mil/ie/download/bsr/BSR2012Baseline.pdf (last visited Jul 5. 2013).
301. See, e.g., In Focus: North Korea’s Nuclear Threats, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/04/12/world/asia/north-korea-questions.html.
302. Cultural Heritage Protection Act, Act. No. 961, Jan. 10, 1962, art. 2, as amended up to
Act No. 10000, Feb. 4, 2010 (S. Kor.), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/kr/kr
117en.pdf.
303. Id.
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cultural properties, as this is not a specific legal requirement of the United
States-Korean Mutual Defense Agreement and Revised Agreements. The United
States does, however, otherwise fully comply with the Korean Cultural
Protection Act. An outside group challenges the lack of impact analysis,
pursuant to the NHPA and the APA. Despite challenges from the Department of
Justice, a federal court hears the case in light of the Dugong ruling, delaying the
relocation for several years and impacting United States-Korea foreign relations.
Meanwhile, the threat from North Korea continues.
Critics may assert that the United States should simply take into account its
actions with respect to the broadly defined Korean cultural heritage well prior to
a federal undertaking. But there is no evidence that that is how Congress
intended the NHPA to apply. To borrow Justice Breyer’s language in Kiobel,
there is no “affirmative intention” concerning how this provision should be
applied in Japan. Nor are there implementing regulations or guidance to this
effect. The ATS and other environmental statutes have not been held to apply in
sovereign territories, and Kiobel reiterated the importance of deferring such
decisions to the political branches in the absence of clear direction. 304 While the
NHPA does implement the WHC treaty obligations, protecting each and every
property within each nation’s historic preservation law is not contemplated by
the WHC; only World Heritage listed properties are afforded concrete
protections.
In the above example, not only are similar foreign policy “weighty
concerns” present as those articulated in Kiobel, there are also additional
national security problems that the NHPA could feasibly impact. In Korea, the
United States has had forces in place for sixty years following the cessation of
hostilities after the Korean War in 1953. Missile tests and the threat of military
attack are a reality on the Korean Peninsula.
An additional example: the United States, as part of its broader “Pacific
Pivot” strategy, is spending a significant amount of money and sending U.S.
Marines to Australia. 305 Inevitably, there will be significant U.S.-funded
infrastructure changes that would constitute a federal undertaking, triggering the
NHPA Section 106 process. And Australia’s “Register of the National Estate”
covers both cultural and natural resources to include wildlife, recognizing that
“cultural values are linked closely to plant and animal populations.” 306 After the
Dugong litigation, any undertaking must be careful to take into account its
impact on Australia’s wildlife, which the WHC does not protect.

304.
305.

Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013).
See Donna Mills, Obama Announces Expanded U.S. Military Presence in Australia,
ARMED FORCES PRESS SERVICE, Nov. 16, 2011, http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?
ID=66098; see also Craig Whitlock, U.S., Australia to Broaden Military Ties Amid Pentagon Pivot
to SE Asia, WASH. POST, Mar. 26, 2012.
306. Borstrom, supra note 299, at 162–63 (stating that other countries, including Denmark and
Canada, have National Registers that provide protection for animals).
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Lastly, consider the potential and uncertain impact of the NHPA in presentday Afghanistan where the U.S. military is aggressively drawing down.
Afghanistan does have a “Law on the Protection of Cultural and Historical
Properties” although it is not so broadly defined as to include wild animals. 307 It
does, however, provide for the protection of historical and cultural properties
that are broadly defined to include any moveable or immovable product of
mankind that has an outstanding historical, scientific, artistic, and cultural
value. 308 Within the law, there is a procedure whereby the Afghanistan Institute
of Archaeology registers protected properties as well as penalties for failing to
comply with the law. And similar to Japanese law, Afghan law lacks procedural
undertaking mechanisms analogous to the NHPA or the NEPA, whereby a
governmental agency—from the United States or Afghanistan—is required to
take into account its actions on the protected properties. And there is not a
judicial redress provision within the Afghan law to challenge an agency action.
Yet, after the Dugong litigation, the United States must be cognizant of actions
during the drawdown that may trigger an undertaking within the meaning of the
NHPA and affect Afghanistan cultural and historical property.
Korea, Australia, and Afghanistan are but three practical examples of how
different nations that broadly provide domestic protections for historic and
cultural properties could affect the way in which the NHPA applies
extraterritorially. While it is beyond the scope of this Article to address each
nation’s historic and cultural property laws, a proper understanding of each and
every one may be required whenever a federal undertaking could feasibly take
place.
V.
CONGRESS SHOULD ACT TO CLARIFY THE NHPA’S JURISDICTION AND SCOPE
The Dugong rulings are the only court opinions that directly address the
scope and jurisdiction of the 1980 WHC amendments. In light of the increased
uncertainty and potential foreign policy and national security concerns as briefly
outlined above, Congress should take proactive steps to clarify the Act’s scope
and jurisdiction as applied overseas. Such action is particularly important as the
DoD has numerous future undertakings throughout the world and a plausible
venue will be the same Northern District of California federal district court that
decided both Dugong I and II.
307. Law on Protection of Historical and Cultural Properties, 2004 (Afg.), available at
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/af/af008en.pdf. Under art. 3, historical and cultural
properties are defined as:
1. Any product of mankind, movable or immovable, which has an outstanding
historical, scientific, artistic and cultural value and is at least one hundred years
old.
2. The objects which are less than one hundred years old, but which because of their
scientific, artistic and cultural value, should be recognized as worthy of being
protected.
308. Id.
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In light of the weighty foreign policy concerns articulated in Kiobel and the
lack of explicit Congressional intent, the 1980 NHPA amendments should be
clarified. A Congressional amendment to the NHPA is preferable, although new
federal regulations that refine the definition and applicability of “undertaking”
and add a new definition of “foreign historic properties” would also suffice. This
would serve to re-anchor the NHPA to its original purpose and intent within the
broader U.S. historic preservation law tradition. Congress can and should do so
while fully complying with the WHC’s treaty obligations. If it desires to protect
living animals such as the dugong in another sovereign’s territory, it should do
so via statutory clarification in the ESA 309 or the MMPA, 310 the two statutes
that unquestionably provide for the protection of living animals domestically.
Doing so would successfully mirror and align the ESA’s and the MMPA’s
extraterritorial scope and application with its domestic scope and application.
A. The Definition of “Undertaking” Should Be Clarified to Properly
Distinguish Domestic from Foreign Undertakings
Much of the confusion stems from the definition of “historic properties”
and “undertaking” when applied to federal activities abroad. As a baseline, the
statutory and regulatory definitions for an undertaking do not neatly correspond
and there is no definition of an “undertaking” outside the United States that
would serve to clarify the scope of the 1980 WHC amendments.
“Undertaking” is defined within the NHPA as:
[A] project, activity, or program funded in whole or in part under the direct or
indirect jurisdiction of a Federal agency, including —
A. those carried out by or on behalf of the agency;
B. those carried out with Federal financial assistance;
C. those requiring a Federal permit license, or approval; and
D. those subject to State or local regulation administered pursuant to a
delegation or approval by a Federal agency. 311

Within federal regulations, undertaking is defined as: “a project, activity, or
program, funded in whole or in part under the direct or indirect jurisdiction of a
Federal agency; those carried out with Federal financial assistance; and those
requiring a Federal permit, license or approval.” 312
The NHPA lists four examples of projects, activities, or programs that may
qualify as an undertaking while regulations expand the list to include those
“requiring a [f]ederal permit, license, or approval.” 313 Textually, it appears that
under both the statute and accompanying regulations, some funding “in whole or

309. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012).
310. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
311. 16 U.S.C. § 470w(7) (2012).
312. 36 C.F.R. § 800.16(y) (2013).
313. Id.
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in part” 314 is necessary to qualify as an undertaking. However, the federal
regulations appear to raise the bar on what may qualify as an undertaking,
limiting the definition to funded projects, activities, or programs requiring a
“permit, license, or approval” under the jurisdiction of a federal agency.
This definitional misalignment has already been a source of domestic
litigation. 315 The problem is only exacerbated when applied overseas as the
NHPA lacks a special provision or definition that applies to foreign
undertakings. For example, what if a foreign nation has the ultimate approval
authority of a federal project and administers the permits and licensing? Would
this impact the “undertaking” analysis? A clear understanding of what is an
“undertaking” is crucial to answer any questions regarding the applicability of
the WHC provision of the NHPA.
Today, one plausible meaning of the term could mean any project requiring
any federal financial assistance. As overseas military and federal activities are
by their nature continually supported by federal assistance, this definition is ill
suited to apply to activities overseas. In light of foreign relations concerns, there
should be an additional definition of an “undertaking outside the United States.”
This new definition would serve an important purpose in light of the weighty
foreign relations concerns discussed earlier. It should address the unique nature
of overseas activities, specifically delineating what role a host nation’s approval
has in determining whether or not an undertaking has occurred within the
meaning of the NHPA.
B. Congress Should Clarify the Terms “Foreign Historic Property,”
“Equivalent of the National Register,” and “Eligible For”
There is virtually no legislative history surrounding the NHPA’s critical
1980 WHC implementing provision. Congress should take steps to amend the
NHPA to clearly define “foreign historic property” and “equivalent of the
National Register” to ensure that the legislation is properly implemented and
understood. A new provision could be incorporated within the NHPA statutory
scheme at 16 U.S.C. § 470a-2(1) to clarify the scope of the statute. Possible
amended language could read:
Section 402 does not expand the definition of “property” or “historic property” as
set forth in both the NHPA and World Heritage Convention. As such, when
applying another nation’s domestic law, the definition of “property” should be
interpreted to apply to “historic property” as set forth in the NHPA and
“properties” as set forth in Articles 1 and 2 of the World Heritage Convention.
This provision does not expand additional protections to properties not afforded
protection by the World Heritage Convention or the NHPA.

314. Id.
315. See Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Fowler, 324 F.3d 752 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (ruling that Congress
intended to impose the Section 106 process on state-agency generated undertakings made pursuant
to delegated federal authority).
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This would have the practical effect of securing the NHPA to its rightful
place nested within the larger historic preservation order. Further, establishing
statutory bright lines will greatly facilitate future overseas planning by all U.S.
agencies while fully respecting the prudential sovereignty considerations of
other nations.
Alternatively, if Congress desires to specifically protect a broad array of
properties, including wild animals within another sovereign’s territory, it should
do so by refining the definition of “high seas” within the ESA and the MMPA or
“waters under the jurisdiction of the United States” within the MMPA. Clearly,
both the ESA and the MMPA could protect wild animals domestically. And the
FWS already lists the dugong as an endangered species. But the MMPA’s and
the ESA’s jurisdiction falls short of that provided by the NHPA. 316 As such,
there is a clear disconnect between the domestic and extraterritorial application
of the NHPA, the ESA, and the MMPA as currently applied. Any protection of a
wild animal overseas should be aligned with the domestic statute offering
similar protections. And this protection of wild animals most properly resides
within the ESA or the MMPA, not the NHPA. 317
To clarify the jurisdictional scope and reach of the NHPA, Congress could
follow what it did with the ESA: amend the Act to prohibit the designation of a
critical habitat on any lands owned or controlled by the DoD. 318 The DoD is
still required to prevent the extinction and harm to endangered species, but there
are no specific mandates under the ESA that affect DoD activities in foreign
nations. 319 In regards to the NHPA, a similar provision could be inserted to
ensure that the DoD is required to meet the WHC’s obligations.
“Equivalent to” is another term not addressed within the NHPA or federal
regulations—yet this term is also critical. If future interpretations follow the
Dugong rulings, “equivalent to” could be read as a magnification of the scope of
the NHPA and the WHC when applied abroad, thus protecting overseas
properties that the NHPA has not protected domestically. In light of the foreign
relations and national security concerns discussed above, Congress or the
Interior Department should address the precise limits and applicability of the
“equivalent to” phrase.
Section 106 requires federal agencies to take into account the effect of the
undertaking on any property that is included in or is eligible for inclusion in the

316. Dugong, Species Profile, U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE,
http://ecos.fws.gov/speciesProfile/profile/speciesProfile.action?spcode=A033 (listing the dugong as
an endangered species) (last visited Mar 8, 2014).
317. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to occur. The ESA and the MMPA mark their fortieth
anniversary next year, and their jurisdictional reach has not yet been expanded to apply within
another nation’s territory. The ESA currently protects the dugong within the “high seas” and the
“territorial seas” of the United States, but the definitions of these key jurisdictional terms have not
yet been expanded to another nation’s territory.
318. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(3)(B)(i) (2012).
319. Id. § 1533(3)(B)(iii); Schoenbaum, supra note 142, at 465.
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National Register. 320 Clarifying this language would have the additional benefit
of ensuring that the overseas application of Section 402 does not exceedingly
impact the NHPA’s domestic application. There are far more places that have
been considered eligible for the purposes of Section 106 review than there are
places listed on the Register. 321 When reconciling Section 106 with Section 402,
some commentators have asserted that a wild animal residing in the United
States could be a contributing element to a habitat’s cultural significance and
would “likely be protected by virtue of the National Register eligibility of the
habitat.” 322 The extraterritorial application of the NHPA may influence its
domestic application, but the NHPA’s origins are as a domestic historic
preservation statute. Congress should clarify exactly what properties are
“eligible for” inclusion domestically, which should define the overarching scope
of the NHPA, at home and abroad.
Lastly, the federal regulations implementing the NHPA provide for
specified National Register criteria for evaluation that are difficult to translate
overseas, including the following: “The quality of significance in American
history, architecture, archeology, engineering, and culture is present in districts,
sites, buildings, structures, and objects that possess integrity of location, design,
setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association . . . .” 323 This criterion
is designed specifically to modify the five tangible resources (districts, sites,
buildings, structures, and objects) that may not exist or have minimal correlation
to another nation’s National Register. These guidelines effectively set forth two
prongs—significance and integrity—that serve as the baseline for evaluating the
importance of the five potential properties. Unfortunately, we are only left with
dictionary definitions of these two terms, as “significance” and “integrity” are
not defined in any relevant statute or regulation. The problem is exacerbated
when attempting to translate the U.S. criteria in a foreign nation. Moreover the
process is inherently subjective: what has enormous integrity and significance in
the United States may have very little in another nation. And the inquiry is
culturally and contextually dependent. Congress should act to address this
incongruity and provide clear direction.
C. The NHPA Should Have a National Security Exemption Provision,
Similar to Existing Language in U.S. Environmental Statutes
While many environmental statutes have a national security exemption
embedded within the statutory scheme, the NHPA does not. 324 Federal
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regulations implementing the NHPA allow the Secretary of the Interior to
promulgate regulations “in the event of a major natural disaster or an imminent
threat to the national security.” 325 Yet, these responsibilities are limited to
waiving the Section 110 requirements and do not affect the Section 106 federal
undertaking process. 326 NHPA regulations also allow for federal agency
officials to develop procedures “for taking historic properties into account
during operations which respond to a disaster or emergency . . . or which
respond to other immediate threats to life or property.” 327 But these procedures
are designed for domestic emergencies (e.g. natural disasters) without any clear
applicability to the NHPA’s overseas application. The President, too, lacks the
authority to declare an emergency in another sovereign nation.
In light of the uncertainty surrounding the NHPA’s future application
overseas, Congress should follow the model of major environmental statutes,
such as the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act, and provide an express national
security exemption provision. 328 The ESA authorizes a special committee to
grant an exemption in the interest of national security. 329 And the Clean Water
Act authorizes the President to “exempt any effluent source of any department,
agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch from compliance with any
such requirement if he determines it to be in the paramount interest of the United
States to do so.“ 330 Yet, the Clean Water Act and Clean Air Act have been
largely limited in their application domestically, with constrained foreign
relations and national security concerns. The NHPA has the potential for a
worldwide jurisdiction that applies to federal undertakings in sovereign nations.
As the NHPA has already impacted foreign relations, a built-in national security
exemption provision would be a prudent step to mitigate any potential national
security impacts affecting federal undertakings overseas.
Critics may assert that there are already too many built-in exemptions to
environmental and natural resource laws and Congress should not restrict
Disposal Act (42 U.S.C. § 6961(a)), and the Safe Drinking Water Act (42 U.S.C. § 300(j)(6)). There
is a specific national security exemption within the CERCLA (42 U.S.C. § 9620(j)).
325. 36 C.F.R. § 78.1.
326. Id. The full text reads:
Section 110 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended (“Act”),
sets forth certain responsibilities of Federal agencies in carrying out the purposes of
the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. Sub section 110(j) authorizes the
Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regulations under which the requirements in
section 110 may be waived in whole or in part in the event of a major natural disaster
or an imminent threat to the national security. Waiver of responsibilities under section
110 does not affect an agency’s section 106 responsibilities for taking into account the
effects of emergency activities on properties included in or eligible for the National
Register of Historic Places and for affording the Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation an opportunity to comment on such activities.
327. 36 C.F.R. § 800.12(a).
328. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (2012) (allowing for an exemption when it is in the “paramount
interest” of the United States).
329. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(j).
330. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a).
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compliance with them. 331 Yet, the exemption process should be at the highest
levels of government and be time limited. Existing exemptions within
environmental statutes are not often granted. 332 It merely provides a clear
process and executive branch flexibility. One scholar in analyzing national
security exemptions, has found that the exemption under the RCRA has been
granted only once and there has never been an exemption under the
CERCLA. 333 Indeed, simply because an exemption is available, it will not
necessarily be widely granted or sought. It does, however, provide for flexibility
by communicating Congress’s intent, allowing the executive branch to weigh in,
and creating a procedure that may alleviate the need for judicial intervention.
The NHPA should mirror its sister environmental statutes and have this built-in
flexibility.
CONCLUSION
In 2010, Prime Minister Hotoyama resigned from his position as Prime
Minister of Japan after serving less than a year. Not surprisingly, the question of
“What to do with the Marines at Futenma?” plagued his administration from the
onset. This issue has only exacerbated tensions between the United States and
Japan that continue to this day, and there is no clear resolution in sight. In
addition, as of this writing, a group of vocal Okinawans has urged secession
from mainland Japan due, in part, to the intransigence over the Marine base at
Futenma. 334
The NHPA’s jurisdictional reach and substantive application have
transformed from its earlier beginnings based in the larger American historic
preservation movement. With the Dugong rulings, the NHPA can no longer be
safely classified as a historic preservation statute that protects physical
properties within the United States. While it is unclear what this court’s ruling
will mean for future military operations and its impact on foreign affairs, the
statute is now effectively adrift and no longer anchored to its roots in American
historic preservation law. As the United States undertakes activities in Korea,
Japan, Australia, and elsewhere, it must be keenly aware of the NHPA’s
extraterritorial application and potential practical application.
In effect, the court’s interpretation of the NHPA has amplified the power of
this statute well beyond its stated purpose and intent, creating uncertainty about
its future application overseas. Congress should take steps to clarify the NHPA
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application and re-anchor the statute. Absent Congressional intervention, the
NHPA must be viewed as not merely a historic preservation statute but one that
also impacts foreign relations.

